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The FBI Charter
Geoffrey R. Stone *
On July 31, 1979, the Carter administration un­veiled its proposed charter for the Federal Bu­
reau of Investigation. The bill (S. 1612jH.R. 5030),
which was drafted by the Bureau itself, has been
the subject of considerable debate and controversy.
The Senate Judiciary Committee and the House Ju­
diciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights have held extensive hearings on the matter,
and full congressional action is expected this spring.
The proposed charter is for the most part the prod­
uct of discontent, not with the Bureau's investiga­
tion of crimes generally but, rather, with its per­
vasive and long-standing surveillance of political
dissidents. It must thus be assessed against the back­
drop of these underlying concerns and in the light
of the Bureau's own history.
The FBI had a less than auspicious beginning.
Attorney General Charles Joseph Bonaparte first
proposed the creation of a federal police force in
1907, but congressional authorization was withheld
because of the widely held view that the establish­
ment of such an agency would lead inevitably to
"a general system of espionage" and would be "con­
tradictory to the democratic principles of govern­
ment." During a congressional recess in 1908, how­
ever, Attorney General Bonaparte quietly estab­
lished the Bureau of Investigation within the De­
partment of Justice. Despite vehement protest in
Congress, the Bureau, with the active support of
President Theodore Roosevelt, survived.
In its early years, the Bureau directed its energies
primarily to enforcement of the Mann Act. Shortly
'*' Professor of Law. Much of the historical discussion in this
article is derived from Professor Stone's article, "Surveillance
and Subversion," to be published in a forthcoming issue of
Reviews in American History.
after World War I, however, Attorney General A.
Mitchell Palmer, frustrated by the Bureau's inabil­
ity to solve a series of apparently anarchist-inspired
bombings, created the General Intelligence Division
(GID) of the FBI to investigate radical and sub­
versive activities. The GID failed to discover the
source of the bombings, but within six months it
had compiled personal histories on 60,000 suspected
"radicals." Before long, the index grew to include
more than 200,000 names. During the Harding ad­
ministration, the Bureau, under the direction of
William J. Burns, accelerated its investigation of
wobblies, anarchists, communists, and "subversives"
generally. The Bureau wiretapped at random, broke
into offices, and compiled information on personal
lives. The targets were often critics of the Bureau
or of the Justice Department and even included sev­
eral senators who may have asked too many ques­
tions.
"In 1924, Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone,
determined to refoc�s the Bureau's activities, ousted
Burns and replaced him with J. Edgar Hoover.
Hoover pledged that the Bureau would get out of
the business of investigating political views and
would henceforth limit itself to its intended func­
tion of investigating federal crimes. For the next
twelve years, the Bureau exercised considerable re­
straint, but with the outbreak of World War II, it
turned its attention once again to the investigation
of political dissidents.
In a series of directives issued in the late 1930's,
President Franklin Roosevelt, alarmed by reported
attempts of foreign agents to influence domestic af­
fairs, instructed Hoover to gather information con­
cerning fascist and communist activities in the
United States and to conduct investigations con­
cerning possible espionage and sabotage. In 1938,
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Roosevelt, Attorney General Homer S. Cummings,
and Hoover decided not to seek legislative author­
ity for this expanding domestic intelligence pro-:
gram. Although these directives did not expressly
authorize the investigation of "subversive activities"
generally, Hoover, apparently reasoning that per­
sons opposed to the American form of government
or to basic governmental policies might engage in
espionage or sabotage, construed the directives as
broadly mandating open-ended inquiries into "sub­
version." And by repeatedly misinforming a succes­
sion of careless or indifferent presidents and attor­
neys general as to the precise scope of the Roosevelt
directives, Hoover managed for more than three de­
cades to elicit tacit executive approval for continu­
ing FBI investigations on an ever-expanding class of
political dissidents. From 1957 to 1974, the Bureau
opened investigative files on more than half-a-mil­
lion "subversive" Americans. In the course of these
investigations, the Bureau, in the name of "national
security," engaged in widespread wiretapping, elec­
tronic monitoring, mail-openings, and break-ins.
Even more insidious was the Bureau's extensive use
of informers and undercover operatives to infiltrate
and report on the activities and membership of "sub­
versive" political associations ranging from the So­
cialist Workers Party to the NAACP to the Medical
Committee for Human Rights to a Milwaukee Boy
Scout troop.
Although some of these investigations were no
doubt aimed at espionage, sabotage, or other federal
crimes (such as violations of the Smith Act), they
served other purposes as well. As early as 1939, the
Bureau, without statutory authorization, initiated
the compilation of a Custodial Detention List con­
taining the names of those individuals who the Bu­
reau determined should be "apprehended and in­
terned immediately" in the event of war. The indi­
viduals' names were derived from subscription lists
of German, Italian, and communist newspapers,
membership in identified organizations, and infor­
mant and agent reports on meetings and demonstra­
tions. Hoover counseled FBI field offices that the
existence of this list and its "purpose should be en­
tirely confidential." Although the Justice Depart­
ment approved the compilation of such a list in 1940,
Attorney General Francis Biddle determined three
years later that the list was not legally justifiable
and ordered that classifications as to the danger
posed by individuals "not be used in the future."
Hoover decided not to comply with this order. In a
letter marked "strictly confidential," he announced
a change in the Bureau's nomenclature and in-
structed his special agents in charge henceforth to
refer to the Custodial Detention cards as Security
Index cards and not to allude to their existence in
communications outside the Bureau. In the late
1940's, the Justice Department once again approved
the maintenance of a Security Index and in the In­
ternal Security Act of 1950, the Congress, ignorant
of the Bureau's program, enacted a statutory emer­
gency detention program. The statutory program,
however, was in many respects more restrictive than
that of the Bureau, and for the next quarter-cen­
tury, the Bureau, often with the knowledge and co­
operation of the Justice Department, frequently dis­
regarded the restrictions of the Act in order to
utilize its own standard of "dangerousness."
COINTELPRO ( counterintelligence program)
was the most daring of the Bureau's activities. By
the late 1950's, the Supreme Court had embraced re­
strictive interpretations of the Smith Act and the
Internal Security Act of 1950, rendering them rela­
tively ineffective in the fight against subversion.
Frustrated by these decisions, and not content mere­
ly to compile extensive files on organizations and
individuals viewed as threats to the nation's security,
Hoover decided to take matters into his own hands.
In 1956 he launched COINTELPRO, which was de­
signed to "expose, disrupt and otherwise neutralize"
dissident individuals, organizations, and movements.
COINTELPRO involved the extensive use of extra­
legal measures to combat domestic subversion. The
Bureau sent anonymous, scurrilous, and false letters
to break up marriages, attempted to sow internal
dissension within organizations, and informed public
and private employers of the political activities and
organization membership of "subversive" persons.
Although directed initially against the Communist
Party, the program expanded over the years to in­
clude Socialist, White Hate, Black Nationalist, and
New Left targets as well. This extraordinary pro­
gram was initiated without any prior executive or
legislative authorization, and although Hoover oc­
casionally informed various attorneys general of the
existence of a counterintelligence program, his ref­
erences were often too vague to make clear what
actually was involved. The very existence of COIN­
TELPRO was a closely guarded secret, shielded
from public view by a carefully crafted system of
multiple filings. As was so often the case in this
period, the Bureau's foremost concern was not with
legality, but with avoiding the embarrassment of ex­
posure. And, as with its extensive political surveil­
lance and emergency detention programs, the FBI's
COINTELPRO was officially terminated only after
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its existence and operation were finally revealed to
the public through a series of exposes, lawsuits, and
congressional investigations in the early 1970's ..
A confidential document stolen in 1971 from the
FBI field office in Media, Pennsylvania, gave the pub­
lic its first hint of the existence of COINTELPRO.
Watergate, however, led to most of the initial reve­
lations. Disclosure of the "Huston Plan" and other
instances of White House misuse of the Bureau
played a central role in the events leading to Rich­
ard Nixon's resignation in 1974. The following year,
Attorney General Edward H. Levi confirmed that
Hoover had maintained secret files on various public
figures, that the Bureau had on several occasions at-
tempted surreptitiously to discredit its CrItiCS, and
that it had gathered political intelligence for ad­
ministrations of both parties. In reaction to these and
other disclosures, Select Committees of the House
and Senate embarked upon investigations of the Bu­
reau's internal security operations, and the House
Judiciary Committee asked the General Accounting
Office to review FBI domestic intelligence policies
and procedures. At the same time, various lawsuits
seeking information under the Freedom of Informa­
tion Act or charging the Bureau with unconstitu­
tional or otherwise unlawful conduct brought forth
further revelations. Within the Justice Department,
Attorney General Levi established a committee to
draw up formal guidelines for FBI investigations.
As early as 1976, Attorney General Levi and FBI
Director Clarence Kelley voiced support for a legis­
lative charter, and as revelations of Bureau abuse
continued to pour forth, the notion of a charter de­
signed to eliminate Bureau reliance on "inherent au­
thority" and to guarantee external oversight of Bu­
reau activities gained widespread legislative, execu­
tive, and public approval.
It is against this background that the proposed
charter was framed. It attempts for the first time to
spell out legislatively the precise duties, responsibili­
ties, and limitations of the Bureau, and it is without
question a serious effort to accommodate society's
interest in effective law enforcement with its often
competing interest in the preservation of civilliber­
ties. There are, however, several significant aspects
of the bill that should cause concern. Although limi­
tations of space preclude an exhaustive analysis of
these concerns, at least a brief comment on those
which seem most important may be of interest.
1. A central purpose of the proposed charter is to
prevent a recurrence of the pervasive political sur­
veillance that has marked so much of the Bureau's
past. The bill thus explicitly declares that, in the
exercise of its criminal investigation authority, the
Bureau "shall be concerned only with ... such con­
duct as is forbidden by a criminal law" and, further,
that the Bureau "shall not conduct an investigation
solely on the basis of . . . the lawful exercise of
any ... right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States." Such straightforward, seemingly
unambiguous declarations of principle can have sig­
nificant symbolic and even practical impact. Stand­
ing alone, however, they cannot satisfactorily guard
against the inevitable temptation to investigate po­
litical beliefs. As history amply demonstrates, the
line between investigating political beliefs and in­
vestigating potential criminal activity by persons
and associations holding certain political beliefs is
fuzzy at best. The Bureau in 1919 was certainly
justified in investigating bombings. It no doubt
thought that it was doing precisely that when it
compiled dossiers on all the anarchists and radicals
it could find. In the late 1930's, the Bureau was cer-
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tainly justified in investigating potential espionage
and sabotage. It no doubt thought that it was doing
precisely that when it gathered information on any­
one even remotely suspected of having fascist or
communist sympathies. Particularly in times of na­
tional crisis, even the most well meaning of govern­
ment officials may too readily make the not wholly
illogical leap from investigating crime to investigat­
ing belief. In at least some circumstances it is, in the
end, merely a matter of degree.
In an effort to lessen the likelihood of such in­
vestigatory leaps, the proposed charter provides that
the Bureau may conduct full-scale "investigations,"
as opposed to less intrusive and more limited "pre­
liminary inquiries," only "on the basis of facts or
circumstances that reasonably indicate that a person
has engaged, is engaged, or will engage in" criminal
activity. Although a step in the right direction, this
requirement is inadequate, at least with respect to
full-scale investigations of associations engaged in
protected first amendment activity. The phrase
"facts or circumstances that reasonably indicate" is
vague in the extreme. Is an association's mere ab­
stract advocacy of unlawful conduct in itself suffi­
cient to satisfy this standard? If so, we have learned
little from the past. For as history teaches, it is not
uncommon for dissident organizations to employ
abstract advocacy as a tenet, dogma, or slogan with­
out in fact posing any bona fide danger to society.
If abstract advocacy is not in itself sufficient, how­
ever, what additional information must be present
before the Bureau may launch a full-scale investiga­
tion? Although the commentary accompanying the
bill adds some substance to this phrase, it remains
disconcertingly ambiguous. This problem is height­
ened by the bill's express authorization of investiga­
tions of politically-oriented associations for possible
future crimes without regard to whether the sus­
pected criminal activity is to take place imminently
or at some uncertain time in the indefinite future.
Such an open-ended authorization will enable the
Bureau to embark upon investigations of virtually
unlimited duration despite the absence of even the
suspicion of present danger. It is precisely these sorts
of free-wheeling investigations that are most likely
once again to lead the Bureau into mischief. To
mitigate this danger, the proposed charter should be
amended so as to permit full-scale investigations
only when, on the basis of clear and objective evi­
dence, there is reason to believe that the association
will engage in criminal activity in the "immediate
future." Although such a standard is obviously not
devoid of ambiguity, it at least focuses attention
upon what should be an important limiting consid­
eration. And although its use would doubtless fore­
stall early investigation of at least some potentially
dangerous organizations, this is a necessary and un­
avoidable trade-off if we mean seriously to avoid a
repetition of the past.
2. The proposed charter delineates the circum­
stances in which the Bureau may employ "sensitive
investigative techniques" in the course of its crimi­
nal investigations. In so doing, however, it seeks in
practical effect to place Congress' formal imprima­
tur upon a class of investigative practices long
thought questionable. The proposed charter approves
the use of trash covers, pen registers, warrantless
arrests, "floater" informants, consensual electronic
monitoring, and electronic location detectors essen­
tially without restraint. It permits the use of infor­
mants and undercover agents to collect information
about "an identifiable person on a continuing basis"
whenever "the information likely to be obtained is
pertinent to" an investigation. And it empowers the
Bureau to issue investigative demands to obtain con­
fidential financial, credit, toll, and insurance infor­
mation from an individual's bank, insurance agent,
telephone company, or credit institution whenever
"there is reason to believe that the records sought
are relevant to an investigation."
Admittedly, the Bureau's utilization of these tech­
niques is not demonstrably unconstitutional. To the
contrary, some of these practices, such as consensual
electronic monitoring, warrantless arrest, pen regis­
ters, and investigative demands, have been held by
the Supreme Court not to violate the fourth amend­
ment. Others, such as trash covers and electronic lo­
cation detectors, have generated considerable divi­
sion among the lower courts but have not yet been
ruled upon by the Supreme Court. What is particu­
larly striking about the proposed charter, however,
is that it, for the most part, authorizes the use of
"sensitive investigative techniques" right up to the
constitutional limit. Apart from the minimal re­
straints imposed upon the use of investigative de­
mands and informers, the overriding assumption
seems to be that "if it's not unconstitutional it's not
undesirable." The privacy and dignitary interests of
the individual are not exhausted by the Constitution,
however, and for Congress to embrace such an as­
sumption would be an abdication of its responsibil­
ity to ensure that the Bureau operates within proper
bounds. The bill does direct the Attorney General
to promulgate guidelines to assure that "investiga­
tions are conducted with minimal intrusion consis­
tent with the need to collect information or evi-
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dence in a timely, effective manner." But Congress
should not pass the buck so quickly. In light of the
Bureau's history, Congress has an obligation inde­
pendently to scrutinize each of these "sensitive in­
vestigative techniques" to determine whether spe­
cific restraints should be imposed in the charter itself.
One aspect of the "sensitive investigative tech­
nique" issue merits special attention. As already indi­
cated, the proposed charter ordinarily permits the
use of informants and undercover agents whenever
"the information likely to be obtained is pertinent
to" an investigation. When the Bureau attempts to
infiltrate an organization suspected of "terrorist ac­
tivity," however, the proposed charter requires ad­
ditionally that the infiltration be "necessary." The
commentary explains that this additional requirement
is imposed because "infiltration of groups whose mo­
tivation may be political raises unique First Amend­
ment considerations." Although this bow to consti­
tutional "considerations" is to be commended, it does
not go far enough. The applicability of the "neces­
sity" standard only in investigations of so-called
"terrorist" organizations is simply inexplicable. This
standard should logically be employed whenever the
Bureau contemplates infiltration of a politically-ori­
ented association, whether or not the suspected crime
is "terrorist" in nature. More fundamentally, infil­
tration of a politically-oriented association should be
permitted only when authorized by a judicial war­
rant premised upon a finding of "probable cause."
Like a wiretap, which is of course subject to such
restraints, an informer poses a severe threat to asso­
ciational privacy. The suspicion that an infiltrator
might be present can cast a demoralizing cloud of
uncertainty and mutual mistrust over the members
of the association and can seriously chill their will­
ingness to speak freely even withfn the confines of
the organization. Moreover, infiltrators not only re­
port on first amendment activity, they participate
in it. An informer can vote, make policy sugges­
tions, and even serve in influential administrative and
leadership positions. In light of the Bureau's past
inclination to employ this technique indiscriminately,
the refusal to adopt a judicial warrant/probable
cause requirement is unfortunate indeed.
3. The proposed charter makes no reference to
COINTELPRO or COINTELPRO-type techniques.
It is unclear whether this omission signifies an en­
dorsement of such techniques, a rejection, or merely
an unwillingness to take a position. The failure to
confront this issue is inexcusable. At the very least,
the charter, tracking the Levi guidelines, should ex­
plicitly prohibit the Bureau from "disseminating in-
formation for the purpose of holding an individual
or group up to scorn, ridicule, or disgrace; dissemi­
nating information anonymously or under a false
identity; and inciting violence." At the other ex­
treme, there may be circumstances in which pre­
ventive action short of arrest and prosecution is war­
ranted. For example, it may at times be justifiable
for practical or investigative reasons for agents to
prevent access to or render inoperative explosives,
firearms, or similar devices when there is probable
cause to believe that the organization intends to em­
ploy them unlawfully in the immediate future. Simi­
larly, there may be limited circumstances in which
the Bureau, in order to prevent imminent crime, may
appropriately inform members of an association
planning imminently to engage in unlawful conduct
that they are presently under surveillance. Beyond
these extremes, there is a vast gray area in which
careful legislative guidance is essential. COINTEL­
PRO was too central an abuse simply to be ignored.
4. The proposed charter announces in no uncer­
tain terms that its provisions may not be enforced
in any way, shape, or form by the judiciary. It ex­
pressly rejects a civil cause of action even for know­
ing, intentional, and substantial violations, and it pro­
hibits any court to quash a subpoena, suppress evi­
dence, dismiss an indictment, or take any other ac­
tion designed to redress violations of its terms. In
defense of this refusal to permit judicial enforce­
ment, Attorney General Civiletti has argued that
there already "exists a full range of suits which can
be brought against government officials who act il­
legally or without authority." The point seems to be
that the creation of a civil remedy would be super­
fluous. This is erroneous. Even in present form, the
proposed charter imposes several important restraints
which go beyond the requirements of the Constitu­
tion. Existing law, however, recognizes a civil cause
of action only for unconstitutional government ac­
tion, and even that cause of action rests on a rather
shaky foundation. Moreover, litigation of constitu­
tional claims against the federal government or its
agents, even when permitted, is presently quite bur­
densome. A statutory civil remedy, patterned, for
example, after the remedy embodied in the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U .S.c. 3417,
might, by eliminating the jurisdictional amount re­
quirement, establishing a minimum liquidated dam­
age provision, and authorizing the shifting of attor­
neys' fees, greatly facilitate such litigation.
Supporters of the bill maintain further, however,
that a civil remedy is in any event unnecessary given
the existing provisions for internal enforcement and
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congressional oversight. The proposed charter in­
structs the Director of the Bureau to "establish an
effective system for imposing administrative sanc­
tions for" violations, and it mandates systematic re­
view of Bureau activities by the Attorney General
and regular reporting of such activities to specified
congressional committees. This is all to the good.
But it is not enough. If history teaches anything,
it is that the danger lies not only in the Bureau, but
in the Congress and the Executive as well. Although
some attorneys general have been careful, respon­
sible, and thoughtful in their supervision of the Bu­
reau, others have been careless and have allowed
themselves to be deceived and manipulated. StilI
others have expressly authorized and encouraged
Bureau activities that, even at the time, were ques­
tionable at best. In some instances, the Bureau vio­
lated its own standards under pressure from the
Executive, and in others, Congress provided the im­
petus or looked the other way. The plain fact is that
with swings in the political pendulum, and particu­
larly in times of real or perceived crisis, the Execu­
tive and Congress may once again lose that sense of
perspective that is so essential to the preservation of
our liberties. Even in times of relative calm, how­
ever, a civil remedy would serve as an important
supplement to these other forms of regulation. It
would enable the judiciary to playa central role in
the interpretation of the charter; it would expose
Bureau activities to public scrutiny; it would gen­
erate additional pressure on the Director to keep his
house in order; and it would compensate victims of
Bureau illegality for violations of their political and
civil rights. In the end, of course, no written docu­
ment or legal charter can by itself "reform" the
Bureau. But it can set us off in the right direction.•
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Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Fees in Stockholder
Class Actions and Derivative Suits
Leo Herzel and Robert K. Hagan*
The subject of the awarding of fees by courts toplaintiffs' lawyers in stockholder class actions
and derivative suits has become very important dur­
ing the last forty years or so because class actions
and derivative suits are increasingly being used by
the courts and in federal legislation as an instru­
ment of social policy. Size of the fees awarded to
plaintiffs' lawyers in such cases determines how
many cases are brought. The method by which
the fees are calculated determines what cases are
brought, how such cases are conducted by the
plaintiffs' lawyers in charge of them, and also how
many cases are brought. The principal purpose in
this paper is to show that, despite the appearance
of fairness, the policy now being pursued by the
courts of awarding fees to plaintiffs' lawyers on
the basis of the fair value of the hours spent by
them is contrary to the social interest.
Beginning with Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v.
American Radiator &- Standard Sanitary Corp}
the federal courts have begun to award attorneys'
fees primarily on the basis of the number of hours
spent rather than on the basis of the benefit con­
ferred." Almost all of the recent writing on the
subject supports the shift in emphasis to hours." In
the Lindy case, which involved the settlement of
an antitrust class action, the court said that a judge
who is fixing attorneys' fees should award only
reasonable compensation which should be deter­
mined primarily by multiplying the number of
hours spent by a reasonable hourly rate and then
making adjustments for several factors such as the
contingent nature and complexity of the case and
,. Leo Herzel is a partner and Robert K. Hagan is an asso­
ciate of the Chicago law firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt.
They are both alumni of the Law School.
the amount of legal innovation required. (Under
the federal antitrust laws, the lawyer for a plaintiff
is entitled to a fee from the defendant if he wins
a judgment after trial, but in a settlement, the fee
must be awarded by the court from the same
sources as in other cases, usually out of the re­
covery.) Since the Lindy case, most of the federal
court opinions which have discussed the subject
have expressly applied formulas in which the num­
ber of hours spent by the lawyers multiplied by
appropriate hourly rates is the primary factor
("lodestar" is the term usually used). 4 Moreover,
a formula for awarding plaintiffs' attorneys' fees
based primarily on their hours spent was included
in the original draft of the new Justice Department
proposals on class actions submitted to Congress,"
although the most recent Justice Department draft
has eliminated the provisions for determining how
to calculate plaintiffs' attorneys' fees."
The problem with awarding fees to lawyers pri­
marily on the basis of the number of hours spent
is that it gives the lawyers a strong incentive to
increase their hours. When fees are awarded pri­
marily on the basis of a percentage of the recov­
ery, there is a direct and simple incentive for the
lawyers to maximize the amount of the recovery
and also to minimize the cost, including lawyers'
hours.
A simple example will illustrate the problem. If
a lawyer has a choice of settling a class action for
two million dollars or taking a one-out-of-two
chance of recovering four million dollars after trial
and appeal approximately three years later, the
class would be clearly better off with a settle­
ment. The mathematical expectation for the two
outcomes is the same, except for the difference in
the time when the money is paid, which clearly
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favors settlement. However, the lawyer does not
have the same interest as the class, because on a
time basis he would receive a much larger fee if
he spends a large amount of time litigating over
the three-year period.
In fact, the problem is even worse than this sim­
ple example suggests. Very often, a defendant's
settlement offer takes into account factors such as
the money and other costs of litigation to the de­
fendant which makes the settlement offer higher
than the present discounted value of any judgment
which can reasonably be anticipated. In addition,
defendants and their lawyers, when making settle­
ment offers, sometimes overvalue the plaintiff's case'
through mistake or because of an unusual bias
. against risk taking or sensitivity with regard to liti­
gation, which would also contribute to making the
settlement worth more than the mathematically ex­
pected value of the case. By awarding attorneys'
fees based on the number of hours spent, however,
the courts have given plaintiffs' attorneys a strong
incentive to ignore these considerations and con­
tinue litigating even though the class would be bet­
ter off with the settlement. As a result, the invol­
untary class clients are in a less advantageous posi­
tion, and the effectiveness of plaintiffs' lawyers as
an instrument of social policy is seriously impaired
because of lawyers' lost time. Moreover, and just
as important, awarding attorneys' fees on the basis
of hours also adds additional social costs by im­
posing time and other expense burdens on the courts
and defendants which early settlement or more ex-
,_ peditious litigation could avoid.
Observation bears out this analysis. Personal ex­
perience has shown that during the last several years,
stockholder suits have become much more difficult
to settle at an early stage in the litigation. The no­
tion that reluctance to settle is evidence of hardier
and more moral plaintiffs' lawyers is naive. The
refusal by a plaintiff's lawyer to accept a settle­
ment may be the height of wisdom or irrational
stubbornness. The fact that he receives a larger set­
tlernent or judgment later throws no light on the
question. The cost or risk incurred mayor may not
have been justified at the time of the first settle­
ment offer. For example, a lawyer may refuse a
million-dollar settlement and recover a judgment
for two million dollars several years later on a case
which at the time of settlement had a one-out-of­
three chance of success. If this is the general policy
of the lawyer, his involuntary class clients, on the
average, will be losers, although in particular in­
stances the clients would gain when the lawyer
happens to be successful. Dawson, despite his ad­
vocacy of awarding fees on the basis of hours, rec­
ognizes that inhibiting settlements and forcing liti­
gation to the bitter end could have extremely
negative consequences,"
The problems connected with awarding fees to
lawyers on the basis of hours are the same as those
associated with cost-plus contracts. In a cost-plus
contract, there is no incentive for the person re­
quired to perform the work to keep down the
costs and to improve the efficiency with which the
work is done. Consequently, the costs can be ex­
pected to be much higher, on the average, than if
there is a fixed contract price. The following is an
evaluation of the use of cost-plus contracts by the
British Government in World War II:
The "cost plus" contract obviously relieves the con­
tractor of [the risk of the actual cost being higher
than was expected at the time the order was re­
ceived.] In its effects, however, the system has been
unfortunate; it offers no incentive whatsoever to
efficiency; under the peculiar type of "cost plus per­
centage profit" system efficiency is, on the contrary,
strongly discouraged, because profits increase with
cost. That the system has, in fact, led to waste and
inefficiency is shown by the Reports of the Select
Committee. They show that most complaints of
waste and inefficiency directed to the Committee
were connected with work ordered on a cost plus
basis."
The difficulties associated with cost-plus arrange­
ments are one aspect of an important basic char­
acteristic of human nature which the psychologist
B. F. Skinner has described in terms of what he
calls "non-contingent reinforcers": "That behavior
is extraordinarily sensitive to the consequences con­
tingent upon it is beginning to be recognized wher­
ever decisions are made. The tragedy of the non­
contingent reinforcer in welfare payments (not to
mention the welfare state) is being examined.:'"
The same argument does not apply to lawyers for
sophisticated voluntary clients (a fair approxima­
tion of defendants in stockholder litigation) be­
cause voluntary clients are free to terminate their
lawyers' . services whenever they are dissatisfied.
The justification for this statement is a corollary
of the economic theory that the allocation of re­
sources in a perfectly competitive economy would
be optimum for any given distribution of income.
In a world of voluntary contracts, nobody has to
buy particular goods or services. If he chooses to
buy, it must be because he is getting a benefit mea­
sured by the price he pays. Competition among
suppliers of goods and services prevents excessive
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profits or oppression by suppliers. The submarket
for the services of lawyers who represent defen­
dants in stockholder class actions and derivative
suits is probably sufficiently dose to the ideal for
perfect competition. In other markets for lawyers'
services, particularly where unsophisticated indi­
viduals are the voluntary clients, lack of informa­
tion about price and quality could seriously im­
pair the validity of an assumption that there is vig­
orous competition.
It may be feasible in some situations for courts
when awarding attorneys' fees to determine in
rough fashion whether some time has been wasted.
For example, it may be possible to determine (or,
sometimes, to maintain a plausible illusion that one
is determining) if different lawyers representing
the same class have duplicated each other's efforts
or if time was wasted on claims that were ultimate­
ly denied. Beyond such rough attempts, however,
it is not realistic to expect judges to make determi­
nations whether plaintiffs' lawyers spent their time
in the most efficient manner. For example, it can
hardly be expected that a judge would disallow
hours because the plaintiffs' lawyers did not make
a motion for summary judgment or refused to agree
to a particular settlement or a stipulation of facts
which would have reduced the hours the lawyers
devoted to the litigation. Decisions to take such
actions are necessarily subjective, and judges cannot
be expected to attempt to substitute their own judg­
ments for the lawyers in charge of the cases except
possibly in the most extreme situations.
Moreover, even crude judicial attempts to solve
the problem of misallocation of lawyers' time can
be misdirected since duplication of effort, or effort
exerted by a lawyer on a legal or factual theory
which is ultimately fruitless, does not necessarily
mean that time was wasted. On projects of any
intellectual consequence there is no effective way
to determine whether time was wasted or effort
duplicated unnecessarily. There are no general rules
for problem solving which could serve as a stan­
dard against which to measure the effectiveness of
lawyers since all knowledge is built on a combina­
tion of successive guesses (hypotheses) and cor­
rected mistakes.!? (There are, however, techniques
for evaluating the correctness of solutions and it is
usually possible to reach some tentative agreement
on the importance of solutions.) Some people ac­
complish very little of importance and make few
mistakes. Others make many mistakes but achieve
outstanding results. Should J. D. Watson and Fran­
cis Crick have been refused a Nobel Prize for their
extraordinarily important discovery of the structure
of DNA because they followed so many leads
which turned out to be wrong and duplicated ef­
fort by working together? 11 It is probably just as
useless to attempt to penalize lawyers for following
up legal and factual theories which have to be
abandoned or for duplicating effort in the solution
of a problem. By far, the best discipline is self­
interest. Plaintiffs' lawyers should bear the cost of
all hours they spend, and they are already required
to share their fees with any coworkers.
A review of recent cases awarding attorneys' fees
on the basis of hours spent confirms the observa­
tion that, as a practical matter, judges do not usually
substitute their own judgments for those of lawyers
by disallowing hours for managing cases inefficient­
ly. In the Lindy case itself, the only time that was
ultimately disallowed by the court was time spent
by the lawyers in negotiating fee agreements and
preparing claim forms for those claimants who had
actually retained the lawyers and time spent by
them on the attorneys' fees application, including
the appeal on that issue.P In general, cases subse­
quent to the Lindy decision have only disallowed
hours which could not be compensated for under
the general fund theory or under statutes awarding
attorneys' fees or which appeared to duplicate the
time spent by other lawyers.P
Occasionally, courts have noted that certain work
was done inefficiently '" or by partners instead of
associates at a higher hourly rate than was justi­
fied,15 and have reduced hours or hourly rates for
such reasons.!" No case, however, has been uncov­
ered where a court has penalized plaintiffs' lawyers
because the court disagreed with their legal judg­
ment on matters involving legal strategy, such as
making or failing to make a motion for summary
judgment or agreeing to or failing to agree to a
settlernent.F Nor have courts usually disallowed
hours because they thought lawyers adopted a legal
strategy which resulted in too much work, such as
engaging in protracted discovery or motion prac­
tice, although occasionally courts have rejected
some of the hours spent on matters such as a brief
because the court thought the hours were excessive. IS
The decisions awarding attorneys' fees on the
basis of an hourly lodestar make another adjustment
which also has very undesirable side effects. The
courts have said that while hours, multiplied by
appropriate hourly rates, are the "lodestar," there
must be adjustments for several factors, one of the
most important of which is the risk and uncertainty
involved in the litigation. This policy is based on
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the fact that normally a lawyer would charge more
than his normal billing rate if he were not sure that
he would be successful and his fee were dependent
on the outcome of the Iitigation.t" The amount of
the adjustment varies in accordance with the amount
of risk and uncertainty. An adjustment of this type
was mentioned in the Lindy case itself'? and has
been taken into consideration in subsequent cases
which have used an hourly basis for awarding at­
torneys' fees." Unfortunately, this adjustment en­
courages plaintiffs' lawyers to bring cases with less
merit. Taking a very simple example, it is not a
wise social policy to make it just as attractive for
lawyers to bring cases with a one-out-of-four chance
of recovering a million dollars for the class as it is
to take cases with a one-out-of-two chance of re­
covering the same amount by adjusting upward the
expected fee for the more risky and uncertain cases.
Ideally, lawyers should be encouraged to bring
those cases with respect to which the law is most
clear and where the violations are the most certain
since, in those cases, society is least likely to waste
its resources, such as courts', lawyers', and defen­
dants' time and expenses, in useless efforts. Increas­
ing attorneys' fees for the risk and uncertainty in­
volved encourages lawyers to bring cases with re­
gard to which the law and the facts are less certain.
In the example, the fees should be the same for both
sets of cases if the recoveries are the same. Plain­
tiffs' lawyers would.still take very risky cases but
only if the absolute amount of the recovery ex­
pected is correspondingly high or the cost of re­
covery can be kept low. If it is desirable to en­
courage legal innovation by plaintiffs' lawyers, a
much better approach which would avoid any bias
toward excessive risk taking would be to increase
their compensation in all cases and not just in mar­
ginal, risky cases.
Increasing the propensity of plaintiffs' lawyers
to take risks by giving them special incentive fees
for risk taking aggravates an already serious prob­
lem since the incentives toward risk taking for plain­
tiffs' lawyers in derivative suits and class actions is
already too high when fee awards are made on an
hourly basis. There are two causes of this bias to­
ward risk taking: separation of ownership and con­
trol between client and lawyer respectively (the
involuntary client problem) and a system of pay­
ment which rewards successes and does not pe­
nalize failures.
A comparison with an ideal theoretical procedure
(used to illuminate the problem and not as a prac­
tical proposal) should make the nature of this bias
clearer. A public auction of all class action and
derivative suits to the highest bidder could be used
to eliminate the separation of ownership and con­
trol. Such an auction could be conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission or some other
governmental agency after public notice describing
the case. Lawyers and laymen would be permitted
to bid, but the layman would be required to obtain
a lawyer of his own choice to handle the case. The
purchase price bid at the auction would be paid
to the class in class actions and to the corporation
in derivative suits, and the class or the corporation
would have no further economic interest in the
case. The purchaser would own the claim.
If, for example, a lawyer (or his client) has sue­
cessfully bid $400,000 for a claim, he would have
to consider the protection of his $400,000 invest­
ment in the case as well as any expense in conduct­
ing the case when he is evaluating a settlement.
The result would be that the lawyer would be
forced to behave like any other private litigant.
His willingness to take risks would be tempered
by his desire to protect his investment, which is
the way the class or the corporation in a derivative
suit would behave if it could hire, control, and pay
its own lawyers.
If, in the example, defendants were permitted to
bid on the cases filed against them, they would be
willing to bid at least the nuisance value of the suit
and possibly much more depending on the defen­
dants' attitudes toward risks and litigation. A plain­
tiffs' lawyer (or his client) who wanted to invest
in the suit would be forced to invest more than the
nuisance value of the suit and would, therefore, be
much less likely to make the investment and to
bring a nuisance value suit. If he did make the in­
vestment, he would be under pressure to settle for
less than he paid in order to protect his investment
against total loss, and the plaintiffs' lawyer and de­
fendant would share the costs resulting from the
lawyer's bad decision. In general, if defendants are
permitted to bid, then, to the extent that they are
the successful bidders, there has been a very efficient
settlement of the case.
The auction model has one intriguing additional
advantage over existing haphazard methods of al­
locating volunteer lawyers to involuntary clients in
class actions and derivative suits. The best qualified
lawyers would bid the. highest prices at the auction
because they could reasonably anticipate the largest
recoveries which would increase the amount recov­
ered by plaintiffs in meritorious class and derivative
suits. The model in the example could be made
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more effective by not holding the auction until
after discovery is completed and awarding the law­
yers who were in charge of the preliminary stage
of the case before the auction a percentage of the
amount paid at the auction as a fee.
Another adjustment made by the courts in the
award of attorneys' fees is for the quality of the
work involved; the higher the quality of the law­
yers' work the greater fee. This adjustment was also
discussed in the Lindy case22 and has been accepted
in subsequent cases." While the courts look to a
number of factors in determining the quality of the
work, the primary factors appear to be the result
obtained and the amount of innovation involved.
The court in the Lindy case noted that the result
is especially important when there has been a set­
tlcment.s! Making the quality of work a factor in
the formula for determining the amount of the fee
award would probably improve the efficiency with
which class and derivative litigation is managed but
only by reintroducing in a roundabout manner the
concept of percentage of recovery. Consequently,
such an adjustment would improve efficiency but
only to a marginal extent, since the lawyers would
know that the lodestar is still based on the number
of hours they record. To the extent that innovation
is a factor in determining quality, there is an un­
desirable bias toward risk taking. Also, by taking
into consideration the benefit produced, the courts
have not escaped one of the problems associated
with awarding attorneys' fees on the basis of a per­
centage of the recovery-how to value the recovery
when it is not readily measurable in monetary
terrns.s" Nevertheless, while measuring the benefit
produced may be difficult in some special situations,
it is substantially easier than determining whether
that benefit was efficiently produced.
In summary, basing plaintiffs' attorneys' fees on
the number of hours worked has probably not pro­
duced any significant advantages but has produced
serious disadvantages when compared with award­
ing attorneys' fees on the basis of a percentage of
the recovery. Awarding attorneys' fees on the basis
of hours spent has removed a very important in­
centive to plaintiffs' lawyers to choose and to man­
age cases in the most efficient manner. Moreover,
the rationale behind using the number of hours
spent as a basis for awarding fees has led the courts
to increase fees where the likelihood of recovery
is small, or the amount of innovation required is
great; lawyers are thus encouraged to pursue more
risky and uncertain cases, which is antisocial in its
effects because it increases the propensity to initiate
suits and to litigate instead of settling marginal cases.
On the other hand, the courts still look to the bene­
fit produced, especially where there is a settlement,
which, to some extent, probably reintroduces a per­
centage-of-recovery factor without eliminating the
bias against efficiency in an hourly basis formula.
The most desirable basis for compensating law­
yers in class actions and derivative suits is a per­
centage-of-recovery formula. This was the method
commonly employed by courts before the present,
overwhelming success of the hourly "lodestar"
merhod.s" In the past, when courts used the per­
centage-of-recovery method, no particular percent­
age of recovery was applied to all cases. The per­
centages applied by the courts ranged from ap­
proximately 10% to 50%. Plaintiffs' lawyers had
no method of predicting in advance what percent­
age would be applied in a particular instance, ex­
cept for the very rough generalization that usually
the percentage applied varied approximately in­
versely with the size of the recovery. The most im­
portant characteristic of any successful procedure
for determining plaintiffs' lawyers' fees is that a
lawyer's best strategy for obtaining the highest pos­
sible fee should be to do his best, i.e., to bring the
cases which have the highest present net expected
value and to litigate them in the most efficient man­
ner possible. A percentage-of-recovery method,
using a flexible schedule of percentages, comes
closest to accomplishing this goal. There is no in­
centive to work extra hours or to avoid settlement
because extra hours are at the lawyer's expense. The
incentive to take risks is exactly correct, because
the only risks that are rewarded are those that are
successful and only as a function of the amount of
the success.
The most important criticism which has been
leveled against awarding plaintiffs' lawyers' fees on
the basis of a percentage of recovery is that it ap­
pears unseemly and brings the courts and bar into
disrepute because of the large incomes earned by
some plaintiffs' lawyers. Once society, through the
courts, has made a decision to use private lawyers
for the achievement of social goals through class
actions and derivative suits, the most important con­
sideration should be the efficient implementation of
the policy. If the policy itself leads to undesirable
results, then there should be a re-evaluation of the
policy. The worst possible solution is to keep the
policy and entangle it in rules which make it oper­
ate perversely. If the underlying problem with a
percentage-of-recovery method of compensating
plaintiffs' lawyers is that the fees awarded are often
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too high, the courts can solve this problem by low­
ering the schedule of percentages they use. The
effect of such a change would be to decrease the
number of cases brought, but there would be no
bias against efficiency. •
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The Brethren
Philip B. Kurland*
Virginia Woolf once wrote: "I think politiciansand journalists must be the lowest of God's
creatures, creeping perpetually in the mud, and
biting with one end and stinging with the other."
Robert Woodward and Scott Armstrong's The
Brethren is further evidence-if any were needed­
to establish the validity of this dictum. The book
is not useful for much else. The publication of The
Brethren is a media event, i.e., an occasion without
any intrinsic importance which is foisted off on a
gullible public through ballyhoo as though there
were something there. It is a tour-de-force effected
solely through "hype." P. T. Barnum would have
loved it.
The Brethren is a journalists' weapon that was
quite clearly aimed at the bete-noir of the Ameri­
can press, the incumbent Chief Justice of the United
States. Chief Justice Burger was an easy target for
the gossip-mongering of which this book largely
consists, for surely at times he is vain, overbearing,
crotchety, self-righteous, and thin-skinned. Nor did
the authors miss their target. But they were firing
a shotgun, not a rifle, and the buckshot they scat­
tered tore the skin of every other Justice as much
as it did that of the Chief. Indeed, it was the three
Justices that the authors and their spies seemed to
regard as the most admirable who were most severe­
ly wounded: Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Mar­
shalL The first of these largely because of the au­
thors' disgustingly graphic depiction of a once­
great jurist-perhaps the last of them-in the last
days of his tenure when he had control over neither
'* Professor of Law and William R. Kenan Distinguished
Service Professor in the College. This review was originally
published in the Chicago Tribune, December 16, 1979. Re­
printed courtesy of the Chicago Tribune.
his mind nor his body. And Brennan appears as a
whimpering, petty, hate-filled, disappointed Don
Quixote, frustrated by the failure of the new Chief
to follow where his predecessor had led. Marshall
is made to look like a clown, in the words of Wood­
ward and Armstrong, like an "Amos and Andy"
character, which is surely unfair.
But then no man is a hero to his lackeys. And
the stories told in The Brethren are essentially built
on the tale-bearings of the Justice's loyal ex-staff
members, law clerks apparently disappointed by
their failures to control the decisions of the Court.
Only Mr. Justice Stevens escapes with his skin
whole, and that probably because the scope of this
volume doesn't cover the Terms of Court during
which Stevens has served.
Doubts must exist as to the truthfulness of the
tale-telling. The sources of the stories are uniden­
tified, allegedly because the tale-bearers were un­
willing to be known for their breaches of confi­
dence. The book consists largely of hearsay, or
hearsay once-, twice-, thrice-removed. That some
of it is heavily embellished by the authors' imagi­
nations seems obvious. That some of it is pure fic­
tion is revealed by the numerous quotations of
thoughts that could be known only to the minds
they occupied. (The few statements of events about
which I have direct knowledge are plainly errone­
ous. These disparities from truth are not important
in themselves, but sow seeds of doubt about all the
other allegedly factual statements unproved by ob­
jective criteria.) Much is accomplished by the au­
thors through innuendo of a kind worthy of Joseph
McCarthy.
I do not mean to deny the validity of the primary
effect of the book, a demonstration that the Em­
peror is in fact naked. That the Justices have, and
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have expressed, distaste for one another, that they
bicker and engage in petty annoyances, that each
regards himself as the keeper of the Holy Grail,
that some lack the learning or intelligence necessary
to an adequate performance of their functions, that
irrationality often replaces rationality as the mea­
sure of judgment, that politics in its lowest form
plays a large role in adjudication, all of these things
cannot be gainsaid.
The fact is, too, however, that the Emperor has
been naked almost since he came to power. Similar
disclosures could have been made-had there been
similar breaches of confidence-about the Justices of
the Warren Court, the Vinson Court, the Stone
Court, the Hughes Court, the Taft Court, etc., back
on to the time when the Great Chief Justice started
the Court on its road to becoming a council of re­
vision and a continuing constitutional convention.
Obviously, the Court as a public institution of
no small power is a very proper subject of informed
criticism. Justice Frankfurter once wrote: "Judges
as persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to
no greater immunity from criticism than other per­
sons or institutions.... Judges must be kept mind­
ful of their limitations and of their ultimate public
responsibility by a vigorous criticism expressed with
candor however blunt." Another great jurist, Judge
Learned Hand, added: "While it is proper to find
fault when their judges fail, it is only reasonable
that [the critics] should recognize the difficulties .
. . . Let them be severely brought to book, when
they go wrong, but by those who will take the
trouble to understand them." Nothing in The Breth­
ren comes close to the kind of reasoned criticism of
the Court's work that was endorsed by Frankfurter
and Hand.
What we have here is simply a collection of per­
sonal crotchets, conceits, quirks, whimsies, foibles,
eccentricities, and caprices of nine human beings
engaged in a task worthy of Plato's Guardians. This
book is not criticism, it is only muckraking. It will
afford titillation to the naive, and rouse the prurient.
interest of the sophisticated, political voyeur. Per­
haps it is in the best tradition of the journalistic pro­
fession, but if so, it is the tradition of Walter Win­
chell rather than Walter Lippman. In terms of im­
portance and longevity, its most likely precedent is
a book by the authors' boss, Benjamin Bradlee's
Conversations with Kennedy. The Brethren likely
will bring no shame to any except those who pro­
vided the offal that was packaged in this volume.
One can readily guess as to the book's lasting
consequences: None. Temporarily, it may cause the
Justices to deny private confidences to their law
clerks or even to their brethren. It may, but it is
not likely to, cause a lowering of popular confi­
dence in the Court which, while it doesn't
_
stand
high in the people's estimation, stands higher than
either of the other two branches of the national
government. Since the power of the Court depends
entirely on public resptct for its judgments, the
Court may come to feel somewhat constrained in
rewriting the Constitution, congressional statutes,
and executive orders. That would be good, but not
likely, so long .as the Justices look upon this book
as the shoddy thing that it is.
The only sure consequence of The Brethren is
that it will enhance the purses of its authors and
publishers, thus giving the lie to Iago's proposition
that "he that filches from me my good name robs
me of that which not enriches him." H. L. Mencken
records an old German proverb: "Little people like
to talk about what the great are doing." •
Professor Philip B. Kurland
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Report from the Center for Studies
Criminal Justice
Franklin Zimring*
The Center for Studies in Criminal Justice wasfou�ded at the University of Chicago Law
School m 1965. Operating in a relatively small aca­
demic unit of the University, the Center's primary
go�l has been to encourage and produce first-rate
basic scholarship and to facilitate the advanced train­
ing of talented scholar-researchers.
Over the past eighteen months, five book-length
�a.nuscripts have been completed under the super­
VISIOn of Center staff. Diverse in scope, subject mat­
ter, and authorship, these completed projects are
representative of the Center staff's current interests
and style of operation.
Wayne Kerstetter, Associate Director of the Cen­
ter and Clarence Day Fellow during 1979, and
Anne Heinz, Research Associate, have completed
a report of a field experiment in Miami, Florida,
which tested the effects of involving judge, de­
fendant, an� victim in the plea negotiation process
by �hannel�ng all negotiation proceedings into a
hearmg. ThIS report was published by the Govern­
ment Printing Office.
The Director of the Center, Franklin Zimring,
served as Rapporteur for the Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward
Young Offenders. The report of that Task Force,
and Zim�ing's Background Paper, Confronting
Youth Crime, were published in April of 1978.
Norval Morris and Michael Tonry, a research as­
so�i�te, edi: a yearly compendium of essays on
critical tOpICS in criminal law and criminology.
Funded by the National Institute of Law Enforce­
�ent an? Criminal Justice and guided by an out­
side advisory board, Morris and Tonry have com-
� Pro!essor of Law and Director of the Center for Studies
10 Criminal Justice.
.
In
pleted the first volume of this work and have com­
missioned papers for the second. The series, en­
titled Crime and Justice: An Annual Survey of
Research, is published by the University of Chicago
Press. Two of the nine chapters in the first volume
were written by research fellows of the Center.
The Limits of Law Enforcement, Hans Zeisel's
definitive examination of the processing of felony
arrests in New York City, was completed in early
1980. Using two separate samples of felony arrests,
the book provides a comprehensive guide through
the .labyrinth of criminal case processing, jail de­
tennon, plea bargaining, and sentencing.
Center staff have also prepared teaching materials
for use in American law schools. Compiled by
Franklin Zimring and research fellow, Richard
Frase, The Criminal Justice System exposes law
students to empirical material dealing with crime,
police, pretrial processes, plea bargaining, and sen­
tencing. This book was recently published by Little,
Brown and Company.
The history of these projects provides an inter­
esting window into work patterns in the Center
over the past few years. One common theme is co­
opera�ion with other research or policy-planning
agencIes. For example, the Zeisel manuscript is based
on a study he initiated as Research Director of the
Vera Institute of Justice in New York; the Task
Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young Of­
fenders was established by the Twentieth Century
Fund; the Annual Survey of Research in Crime and
Justice was prepared in collaboration with the Na­
tional Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
justice and the University of Maryland; and the
pretnal settlement experiment will be replicated by
other researchers in consultation with the Center.
A second theme of Center publications is collabo-
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ration between authors. Three of these five major
works involve co-authorship, and a fourth was
written in collaboration with a task force. Typi­
cally, major research or editorial projects involve
two authors, one with an academic affiliation at the
University of Chicago and one with an academic
appointment at another university.
Similar interinstitutional collaborations character­
ize recently undertaken research. Wayne Kerstetter
is conducting a survey and analysis of team policing
for the Center, partially supported by the Police
Foundation in Washington, D.C. The Sentencing
Guidelines Project, directed by Michael Tonry, is
a joint undertaking with the University of Mary­
land Law School. Franklin Zimring is collaborating
with the Rand Corporation on a study of sentencing
policy toward young offenders in criminal courts.
This cooperative effort is both necessary and
healthy. Such arrangements have special value for
the Center because they expand the scale of research
without the burden of a large permanent staff, high
overhead costs, or space requirements that would be
inconsistent with the Center's affiliation with the
Law School.
The financial history of these recent Center proj­
ects is also worth noting. The pretrial settlement
experiment was funded by a large grant from the
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Crimi­
nal Justice. As usual, the funding period was shorter
than the time required to complete the project re­
port. Modest but critical supplemental support pro­
vided by the Clarence Day Foundation enabled
Wayne Kerstetter to complete the monograph. The
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Crimi­
nal Justice will fund the replication of this study.
Although the Twentieth Century Fund provided
support for the work of its Task Force, no money
was budgeted by that organization for empirical
work. However, when the opportunity arose to ex­
plore the relationship between age and sentencing
outcome in Washington, D.C., a grant from the
Nancy and Raymond G. Feldman Fund made it
possible to add an original research contribution to
the work of the Task Force. The felony disposition
study was originally funded through a grant from
the National Institute to the Vera Institute of Jus­
tice. That grant represented 95% of the resources
expended on the project, but funds were not avail­
able to support needed additional data analysis dur­
ing 1977 and 1978. A modest grant from the Feld­
man Fund made possible the more refined analysis
which has greatly enhanced the value of the book.
Support for the preparation of The Criminal Jus­
tice System came from the Arnold and Frieda
Shure Fund for Research at the University of Chi­
cago Law School.
These fiscal case histories illustrate both the mix
of public and private funds that has supported the
Center's work in the past and the important role of
relatively small supplemental private funds in fa­
cilitating the completion of research. The Center
depends on private funding to take advantage of
opportunities for inexpensive but innovative re­
search and for pilot projects. Thus, while private
funding has represented less than half of the Cen­
ter's total expenditures, it has been essential to the
character and nature of the Center's work.
The number and variety of research interests pur­
sued by Center staff defies the discipline of an or­
ganizational chart. Norval Morris is principally con­
cerned with the jurisprudence of sentencing con­
victed offenders, the proper role of imprisonment
in criminal law, and the relationship between the
state's mental health power and the administration
of criminal law; Morris and Michael Tonry serve
as editors of the Annual Survey, and Morris con­
tinues as general editor of the Studies in Crime and
Justice. Professor Morris also plays an active role in
monitoring the progress of the prisonprogram he de­
signed at the Butner, North Carolina, federal prison.
Wayne Kerstetter has undertaken an ambitious
series of studies on police patrol, police manage­
ment, and the assessment of efforts to reform urban
police departments.
A grant from the Chicago Bar Foundation en_­
abled the Center to award visiting fellowships to
Gordon Hawkins in 1978 and James B. Jacobs in
1979. Hawkins is now completing an analysis of
movements in the American prison population over
the last decade. Jacobs plans a follow-up study of
Stateville Penitentiary, the setting of his 1977 book,
Stateuille: The Penitentiary in Mass Society. He is
also studying trends in the use of coercive social
control in the United States since World War II.
Richard Block recently completed a comparative
analysis of crime and criminal justice in the United
States and the Netherlands. Hans Zeisel is pursuing
studies on the relationship between race, discre­
tion, and the death penalty. Michael Tonry is con­
tinuing to supervise the activities of the model fed­
eral sentencing commission. Franklin Zimring is in­
volved in a series of empirical studies relating to
violence, young offenders, and the general deterrent
effects of criminal sanctions. One pending study,
an attempt to assess the impact of the New York
Legislature's 1978 "crackdown" on violent youth
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crime, combines all three of these research inter­
ests. Finally, Hans Zeisel and Ellen Fredel are study­
ing the reliability and utility of arrest statistics re­
ported by municipal police departments to the Uni­
form Crime Reporting Section of the F .B.!.
Almost all of these research activities reflect long­
standing commitments of Center fellows to partic­
ular areas and study topics. Many of the subjects of
current projects have been part of the Center's
research agenda since 1965: sentencing, deterrence,
the prison, mental health, and criminal law. The
sequence of studies in violence is now entering its
eleventh year. These sustained research programs
provide the continuity and flexibility necessary for
the informed empirical study of crime and the
criminal law. Recent productivity of Center staff is
due, in no small measure, to the momentum gener­
ated by our work in earlier years.
The majority of Center fellows now hold aca­
demic appointments at institutions other than the
University of Chicago. One result is that the Cen­
ter's population is subject to the same kind of sea­
sonal variation as Martha's Vineyard-far larger in
the summer than in the winter months.
It is easy to over-estimate the role of premedi­
tated design in the development of the Center.
However, the staff is pleased with the result of this
evolutionary pattern. Plans for the Center's future
owe much to the fortuitous but satisfactory events
of recent years.
The staff's ambition is to remain a small research
and training institution that serves as an intellectual
clearing house for empirical studies in the adminis­
tration of the criminal law. To achieve that end,
research professionals engaged in the Center's activi­
ties might be divided into four categories: Faculty
Fellows, Research Associates, Visiting Fellows, and
Fellows. Faculty Fellows are full-time faculty mem­
bers at the University of Chicago who are contin­
ually involved in the research activities of the Cen­
ter. At present, Professors Morris, Zeisel, and Zim­
ring fit that definition.
Research Associates are resident scholars engaged
in Center research. Typically, a Research Associate
comes to the Center shortly after completing doc­
toral work in law or social science and stays for a
period of two to four years, sharpening substantive
and methodological skills while contributing to
Center-sponsored research. We anticipate that Re­
search Fellows will "graduate" from this status into
faculty positions at other major American universi­
ties. This pattern has already characterized the ca­
reers of James Jacobs (Cornell University), Richard
Frase (University of Minnesota), Michael Tonry
(University of Maryland), and Wayne Kerstetter
(University of Illinois). The Center usually em­
ploys two or three such resident professionals.
Visiting Fellows are typically older and more
experienced academic research professionals who
come to the Center to pursue research projects of
their own choosing. Such persons find the Center
an attractive place to visit because of the individual
skills of other Center personnel and because our
numbers, while small, constitute impressive depth
in an area where most individuals work in isolation.
Our Visiting Fellows have included Johannes An­
deneas (Oslo), George Stiiriip (Denmark), and
Mark Haller (Temple University). Their work has
ranged from seminal studies on deterrence to a his­
tory of organized crime.
Fellows are those individuals who maintain con­
tinuous research ties with the Center for Studies
in Criminal Justice but have academic appointments
elsewhere; they are physically in residence only oc­
casionally. Usually, Fellows are recruited from for­
mer Research Associates or Visiting Fellows, and
Visiting Fellowships are offered to active Fellows.
Some obvious examples include Hawkins, Jacobs,
Frase, and Tonry.
The advantages of this structure are economy,
flexibility, continuity, and an enhanced capacity to
influence the course of research at other institu­
tions. With such a structure, the Center will con­
tinue to finance large-scale research with federal
funds; however, visiting fellowships and pilot proj­
ect support must come from private funds if the
Center is to continue activities on the same scale
that has characterized it in recent years. _
While this pattern of organization is appropriate
for the work of the Center, it may also serve as a
model for research and training in other law-related
research endeavors. The lack of explicit empirical
training for future legal academics, the absence of
legal scholars in many law-related specialities, and
the outright loneliness of the research process have
stunted the growth of empirical research in Ameri­
can law. Ultimately, this Center may be more im­
portant to the Law School as an experiment in or­
ganization for research and teaching than as a re­
search agency in criminal justice. If this is the case,
the Center's four years of operation without major
foundation support are of special value. The ques­
tion of whether research centers such as this can be
established for short periods of time with large ex­
ternal grants is rather less important than whether
such centers can mature into important constituents
of the academic legal enterprise. •
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On the Strange Making, Training, and Thinking
of an American Law School Dean
Gerhard Casper*
A
candidate for a vacant deanship recently told a
search committee that deans are like champ i­
gnons. At first impression the comparison evokes as­
sociations which seem pleasant enough. Champi­
gnons, after all, are-and always have been-a rare
delicacy. Indeed, these days in particular, law school
deans have become rather uncommon. About once
a week I am advised of a vacancy in a law school
deanship. However, this is not what the candidate
who made the comparison had in mind. He thought
deans were like champignons because one keeps
them in the dark until they are ready to be canned.
As my faculty and students do their best to keep
me in the dark, I am not well positioned to shed
much light on the present problems of legal edu­
cation. Under these circumstances, I thought it
might be appropriate to speak in part, not about
where we are going, but where I have come from.
Permit me one paragraph about life stations. I
was born in Hamburg in 1937. I entered primary
school as World War II ended. My law studies
were undertaken at the universities of Hamburg
and Freiburg. In 1961, I did graduate work in law
at Yale Law School, returned to Freiburg after­
wards for a Ph.D. in law in the European fashion.
My dissertation was on the so-called "realist" move­
ment in American jurisprudence. In 1964, I ac­
cepted an offer from the University of California
at Berkeley, and in 1966 I came to Chicago. Degrees
did, of course, not end my legal education. As those
of you who practice law have learned much of
your law after graduation from law school, I learned
much of my law teaching (especially American
constitutional law, which used to be my preoccu­
pation until I became dean) . All of this seems
• Dean of the Law School. These remarks were originally
made at the Law Club of Chicago on December 6, 1979.
rather straightforward, not even unduly exotic.
However, it understates my exposure to American
law and legal practice.
My first encounter with practical aspects of
American law took place in 1953, when I was fif­
teen years old. I had been selected to go to the
United States as a delegate to what was known as
the New York Herald Tribune Forum, a four­
month program aimed at increasing international
understanding. The New York Herald Tribune an­
nually brought together about thirty students from
as many countries (European countries, Israel, Arab
states, old and new nations of Asia and Africa). At
that time, visas for German citizens had to be ap­
proved in Washington. A week before my sched­
uled departure for the United States, I still did not
have a visa. I went to the American Consulate Gen­
eral in Hamburg for help. A Vice-Consul said he
was sorry, but there was nothing he could do about
it as Washington was probably searching for my
war records. When I pointed out that I had been
all of seven years old when the Third Reich came
to its end, the consul simply shrugged his shoul­
ders. The authorities at the Hamburg Board of
Education, to whom I turned next with a request
for assistance, told me that they could not and
would not intervene. By now, there were three days
to go. At this point, I remembered that I had pre­
viously gotten to know the director of the Ameri­
can Information Center in Hamburg. I made an
appointment and described my difficulties. He said,
"No problem at all, Gerhard," picked up the tele­
phone, called the consulate, and spoke to some per­
son in authority: "John, this is Bill. I have young
Casper here who needs and should have a visa by
tomorrow. Can you please make the arrangements?"
The next day I had my visa and a lesson on the
equal and broad sweep of administrative procedures
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on the one hand, and pragmatic approaches to the
question of how to deal with snags on the other.
As we are on the subject of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, I am reminded of another
lesson in bureaucracy, both charming and a bit dis­
concerting. When I became a citizen, I learned that
part of the process is an examination by an officer
of the Service into one's political and personal back­
ground, covering, to this date, such subjects as com­
munism, adultery, and parking tickets. Traffic and
parking violations took up at least five minutes of
the interview. I trust you will be glad to learn that,
to the best of my knowledge, I am the first dean of
an American law school for whom the United
States Government has certified that he knows how
to read and write. To the dictation of the exam­
ining officer, I had to write the sentence: "I am
a professor of law at the University of Chicago."
I also had to read aloud, from a catechism for citi­
zens, something to the effect that a good citizen
always puts the welfare of his country first. All of
that was easy. I encountered greater difficulties
when I was tested on my knowledge of American
constitutional law, my field of expertise. While I
got high marks for my response to the demand that
I enumerate the three branches of the federal gov­
ernment, the examiner and I did not quite agree
on the meaning of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
My first encounter with the United States in 1954
was bewildering, intriguing, and obviously suffi­
ciently fascinating to bring me back. If a sixteen­
year-old can survive living with six different host
families in the New York metropolitan area, from
Massapequa, Long Island, to the Bronx over a three­
month period, he can survive almost any cross-cul­
tural challenge. The first months of 1954, if you
recall, were the crucial period in the fall of Senator
Joe McCarthy. Watching the debate-indeed, being
made part of it by that very American notion of
hospitality which embraces the foreigner as a dis­
cussant-was a special kind of introduction to the
first and fifth amendments and the complex inter­
play of public opinion and political processes.
Nothing ever quite matched those three months
in my informal education, with the possible excep­
tion of a seven-week "legal" journey through the
South and West, which I undertook with a Scots
fellow student in 1962 after graduating from Yale.
For instance, we came to a motel at the outskirts of
Birmingham, Alabama, driving a friend's old car
with a Connecticut license plate. The manager
treated us with formality and reserve. We had not
even reached our room when she came rushing
after us with a huge bowl of ice cubes. "Oh, I
apologize," she said. "I just read your registration
card [on which we had innocently given our re­
spective home addresses in Europe]. I thought you
were Yankees, but now I see you are foreigners.
Welcome to Alabama. I hope you will have a won­
derful time."
During that Southern trip, my friend, Ranald
McLean, and I earned our way-as I still do-with
after-dinner speeches. We got to a small town in
South Carolina. The president of the local Rotary
Club took us around town and pointed out which
was the white school and which was the black
school. At law school, we had, of course, studied
Brown v. Board of Education. Since this town had
made no attempt to desegregate its schools, we were
inclined to interpret the community's attitude as a'
violation of the Constitution. Our host told us that
Yale had failed to teach us the' fundamentals of
Article III and federal jurisdiction. Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the Constitution, he said, had
no general effect or application. As long as there
was no specific court order to desegregate these
very schools, there was no legal obligation to do so.
As Cooper v. Aaron remains controversial to this
day, this was at least a debater's point. For better
or for worse, our exchange also capsuled a differ­
ence between European and American views of law
and modes of legal education.
The typical European law school curriculum
covers the most important areas of law from the
civil code to criminal law, administrative and con­
stitutional law. The predominant mode of instruc­
tion is the lecture method (you must keep in mind
that law schools have thousands of students and a
professorial staff not substantially larger than that
of an average American law school). The subject
matter is the positive law-conceptualized, system­
atized, occasionally even problematized, to be sure
-but the emphasis is on somewhat abstract infor­
mation about general rules and principles of law,
supplemented by practice exercises in their appli­
cation. Even those law professors who pride them­
selves on being "progressive" find their progressive
solutions usually by vigorous, if not rigorous, de­
ductive reasoning. For instance, in postwar Ger­
many, law professors and courts have been busily
engaged in turning the constitution into a coherent
and comprehensive ideology which provides an­
swers for the most difficult social and political ques­
tions.
We in the United States, on the other hand, re­
main preoccupied with cases and court decisions.
This has led to a state of affairs where American
21
Dean Gerhard Casper
legal education has, for instance, substantially ne­
glected the institutional arrangements of govern­
ment, though uncertainties increasingly abound over
the question of who governs in what respect and
on the basis of what authority. Both the European
and the American approaches may be wrong. While
I have little patience for the European tendency to
engage in excessively abstract and deductive rea­
soning, the exceedingly narrow-minded question­
"But is there a court decision on the point?"-often
leads American lawyers to ignore the systemic con­
text and implications of legal institutions.
Unfortunately, the American lawyer's predilec­
tion for the specific has not protected us against
highly speculative manipulation. In constitutional
law, in particular, the combination of the case
method with ad hoc ideological speculation has
made us all but forget the admonition of Joseph
Story, the two-hundredth anniversary of whose
birth this year nobody seems to be celebrating:
"Upon subjects of government it has always ap­
peared to me that metaphysical refinements are out
of place. A constitution of government is addressed
to the common sense of the people; and never was
designed for trials of logical skill, or visionary spec­
ulation." My colleague, Philip Kurland, may have
had a point when he suggested the other day that
we found "a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty
to the Constitution and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made or which shall be made, un­
der the authority of the United States."
In 1964, I returned to the United States, mostly
because of my respect for American universities,
which has since developed into an admiration, es­
pecially for the educational miracles performed by
private universities with extremely scarce resources.
Their autonomy is one of the most glorious aspects
of America's contribution to higher education. To
a very large extent, this autonomy has been made
possible by the abiding devotion of outstanding
lawyers such as your deceased President and our
alumnus, Jerry Weiss, who applied his prodigious
energies to the support of his alma mater. I am,
nevertheless, worried about the future on two
counts.
First, the cost of running great private law schools
is growing faster than the income they can raise
from traditional sources. My colleagues at Colum­
bia, Harvard, Northwestern, Pennsylvania, Stan­
ford, and Yale-to mention but a few-agree that
this state of affairs has dangerous implications not
just for the law schools but for the legal profession
as well. Law schools serve the profession and the
public not only through the education of future
lawyers but also through the research and writing
of faculty members who, in many instances, now
find themselves with lower real incomes than they
had ten years ago. More importantly, the level of
law faculty salaries, by comparison with law prac­
tice, is extremely unfavorable to our ability to at­
tract young teachers. In addition, we find it difficult
to cope with extraordinary cost rises in such areas
as library acquisitions. One of the unfortunate as­
pects of this situation, aggravated by some of the
ideological trends I referred to earlier, is that law
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schools may be losing their moorings in the profes­
sion. It has become apparent that substantially in­
creased private support is essential if we are to c.on­
tinue to maintain institutions for high quality teach­
ing and research.
Secondly, we are being regulated to death. Since
becoming dean on January 1, 1979, I have been
taken aback by the volume of regulations, proposed
regulations, guidelines, and so on, issuing from the
Section of Legal Education of the American Bar
Association and similar bodies. The irony of these
regulatory efforts is the fact that it is largely the
private sector which does the regulating. Its volume
does not lag behind governmental regulation. It is
sad indeed that the American Bar Association, of all
organizations, is beginning to pose a threat to aca­
demic freedom.
The ABA either tells us or would like to tell us
how to govern our law schools, what students to
admit, whom to give scholarships to, what to teach,
how to teach, what resources we should allocate to
our library, and so forth. The federal government
concerns itself with whom we should hire as fac­
ulty. The Supreme Court of South Carolina recent­
ly attempted to prescribe the college curriculum
to be followed by prospective lawyers including,
among other things, courses in speech. When I was
a child, I was told that the Prussian version of the
story in Genesis about why Adam and Eve were
driven out of Paradise was that the tree of knowl­
edge from which Eve picked the apple stood in the
center of a lawn which bore a sign "Do not walk
on the lawn." This story can soon be told about
the United States with equal justification. In the
course of the academic year 1978-79, the Section
of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar issued
about sixty memoranda (that is better than one a
week), often lengthy, to deans of ABA-approved
law schools.
I should like to provide one example which is
quite trivial on the one hand and pernicious on the
other. The Section of Legal Education has recently
proposed an amendment to accreditation standard
201 which would require us to engage in periodic
"self-study." The fact that its parentage includes
the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare and that a requirement of this nature is
already part of the accreditation and reinspection
processes offers little comfort. On the basis of my
knowledge and experience, I think that I can safely
assert that no country in Western Europe, where
legal education is very tightly controlled by the
state, would impose a requirement as intrusive of
academic freedom and as wasteful as this one. Re-
quirements of this type are open-ended invitations
to indirect regulation.
The latter point is illustrated by Recommenda­
tion 13 in the recent report of the so-called Task
Force on Lawyer Competency: The Role of the
Law Schools, for which the Section of Legal Edu­
cation is also responsible. Recommendation 13 pro­
poses that the self-study requirement "should be
expanded to include specific consideration of the
responsibility of the school to ensure that its gradu­
ates meet adequate fundamental lawyer skills" which
include "oral communication, interviewing, coun­
seling, and negotiation." One is surprised not to
find as part of the list the recommendation pro­
posed by the most immediate past president of the
ABA that law schools should "encourage the teach­
ing of law office management skills." About this
suggestion, Judge McGowan, in a talk at the Uni­
versity of Chicago Law School last year, com­
mented, "Surely attendance at one law school fac­
ulty meeting, followed by a visit to a few law pro­
fessors' offices should be enough to demonstrate that
this is a hollow dream at best." If the American Bar
Association continues to go down the road of forc­
ing all of us into procrustean beds, I think it will
become absolutely mandatory for the major law
schools in this country to seriously consider making
a concerted effort to change the regulatory system.
Increasingly, the organized bar seems to be asking
the question: "What can we make law schools do
to get us out of trouble with the Chief Justice, the
President, and the public?" Obviously, the questions
we ask determine the answers we get. I am reminded
of one of my favorite stories, which I learned my
first year of law school in Hamburg, when I availed
myself of the opportunity to sit in on courses in
other departments. One such course was in the
Divinity School, and the instructor described a de­
bate between a Jesuit and a Benedictine monk as to
whether one is permitted to smoke while praying.
The Jesuit thought it was permissible to smoke
while praying. The Benedictine took the opposite
position. They referred the matter to their respec­
tive superiors. When they got together again, each
had been confirmed in his views. The Jesuit could
not understand the stubbornness of the order of St.
Benedict. What question did you ask, he interro­
gated his brother. "Are you permitted to smoke
while praying?" "No wonder," the Jesuit responded.
"I asked whether you may pray while smoking."
I sometimes wonder whether the greatest issues
in American legal education today do not turn on
the appropriateness of the questions we want the
law and the law schools to answer. •
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Earl B. Dickerson at 88
Karen Gardner*
To
hear Earl B. Dickerson speak, one might be
charmed into believing that his remarkable ca­
reer was just a series of fortuitous coincidences. To
follow his career, however, from the time of his
graduation in 1920 as the first black to earn a J.D.
degree from the University of Chicago Law School,
soon leads one to the realization that he is an extraor­
dinary man. A distinguished attorney, Mr. Dickerson
was a former president of the Supreme Life Insur­
ance Company of America; a founder of the Ameri­
can Legion; a former president of the National Law­
yer's Guild, the National Bar Association, and the
Chicago Urban League; civil rights activist; and
Franklin D. Roosevelt's appointee to the first Fair
Employment Practice Commission-to name but a
few of his many accomplishments.
A conversation with Earl Dickerson, 88, is a his­
tory lesson told with wit and humor. Not only has
he known such great public figures as Franklin
Roosevelt, Martin Luther King, and Paul Robeson,
but he fondly remembers former Law School pro­
fessors, Ernst Freund, Harry Bigelow, Ernst Putt­
kammer, James Parker Hall, and Floyd Russell
Mechem.
Dickerson has also participated in important his­
torical events, particularly the civil rights movement.
He says that he has always "quarrelled with any
vestige of inequality that makes distinctions on the
basis of race," and he chose to fight through the
courts and through organizations such as the Na­
tional Lawyers Guild, the NAACP, and the Demo­
cratic party in Chicago politics. His most celebrated
legal case, argued before the U.S. Supreme Court
and won in November, 1940, was Hansberry v. Lee,
'" Editor of The Law School Record.
et al. This landmark case broke down the use of
racial restrictive covenants in the Hyde Park-Ken­
wood community of Chicago, opening up twenty-six
city blocks for occupancy by blacks and other mi­
norities.
During the Depression, Mr. Dickerson was instru­
mental in saving the Supreme Life Insurance Com­
pany of America, the second largest black-owned
insurance company in this country, from financial
ruin. Dickerson has stated that, "When most of the
life insurance companies in the State of Illinois were
going into insolvency and declared so by the Direc­
tor of Insurance, I prepared [as General Counsel to
the company] a policy lien for execution by policy
holders of the company. By this means, we were
able to raise more than one-half million dollars in
company assets. This lien was tested in the Supreme
Court of Illinois and found valid." The importance
of this company to millions of people cannot be
overstated, as blacks had been consistently denied
insurance by white-owned companies.
A fighter, considered by some in the 1950's to be
"subversive," Dickerson inherited this spirit from his
family, who traditionally resented the indignity of
racial discrimination. Born in Canton, Mississippi, in
1891, Dickerson left the South at the age of fifteen
and came to Chicago via the Illinois Central Railroad.
In Chicago, he was encouraged to attend the Evans­
ton Academy, a former preparatory division of
Northwestern University, and the University of Illi­
nOIS.
Because blacks had not been allowed to practice
law in the South when Dickerson was growing up,
as a youth he never gave much thought to the legal
profession. However, while in college, Dickerson
was quick to see that through the law he might con­
tribute to social change. Dickerson explained that he
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was "never the guy to sit quietly while the [racial]
battle was raging," and thus he applied for admit­
tance to the Law School, which he entered in 1,915.
Dickerson's legal education was interrupted by
World War I, during which he served as one of the
first black lieutenants in the U.S. Army. After serv­
ing for two years in the war, Dickerson returned to
the Law School and graduated in 1920.
Dickerson has been quoted elsewhere as saying,
"One of the greatest moments in my life was in 1914
at the University of Illinois. I was receiving my de­
gree and I looked in the audience at my mother who
had come up from Mississippi for the occasion. And
she was there when I became the first black man to
earn a doctor of jurisprudence degree from the Uni­
versity of Chicago. Each time I almost cried."
Dickerson has since gone on to earn an Honorary
Doctor of Laws degree from Northwestern Univer­
sity and an Honorary Doctor of Humanities degree
from Wilberforce University, as well as awards from
the University of Chicago, the NAACP, the Black
Illinois Legislative Lobby, the Abraham Lincoln
Center in Chicago, and the Cook County Bar Asso­
ciation.
Now Honorary Chairman of the Supreme Life In­
surance Company, Dickerson still manages to go to
his office at least twice a week. His physical and
mental vitality belie his advanced years, and one
could easily spend hours listening to him tell of a
career which has spanned 60 years. His stories are
not only fascinating for their descriptions of places
now buried under skyscrapers and people familiar to
most of us only through history books, but they are
also entertaining in their own right, reflecting Dick­
erson's appreciation of the full and active life he has
had. He is too humble to take much credit for all
he has accomplished during his lifetime, yet the facts
speak for themselves. Clearly, he is one of the Law
School's outstanding alumni, who throughout his
long career, has fought against racial inequality. -
Earl B. Dickerson
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Rockefeller Chapel
Memoranda
New Appointments to Faculty and Staff
Mr. Douglas G. Baird has been appointed Assis­
tant Professor of Law, beginning July 1, 1980. Mr.
Baird is a 1979 graduate of Stanford Law School,
where he served as Managing Editor of the Stanford
Law Review. Upon graduation, he was elected to
the Order of the Coif. Mr. Baird obtained his B.A.
in English summa cum laude from Yale College in
1975. His teaching and research interests include
commercial law and intellectual property. He is pres­
ently law clerk to Judge Dorothy Nelson, United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Effective July first, Mr. Joseph Isenbergh begins
his appointment as Assistant Professor at the Law
School. A graduate of Columbia University and the
Yale Law School, Mr. Isenbergh specializes in the
area of tax law. Presently, he is a member of the
Washington, D.C., law firm of Caplin & Drysdale.
Mr. Douglas Lay cock has been promoted to Pro­
fessor of Law with tenure in the Law School. Mr.
Laycock is a 1973 graduate of the Law School and
has been teaching at this school since September,
1976. His primary areas of interest are civil liber­
ties, equity, and federalism.
Professor Henry Monaghan has been appointed
the Harry Kalven, Jr., Visiting Professor of Law
for the winter and spring quarters of 1981. At pres­
ent, Mr. Monaghan is the Robert S. Stevens Profes­
sor of Law at Cornell University Law School.
Among the courses Mr. Monaghan will teach at the
Law School will be one on the First Amendment.
Ms. Sandra Slagter, who replaces Lee Cunning­
ham (now Assistant Director of Admissions at the
Business School), began her duties as Registrar on
January 16. Before coming to the Law School, Ms.
Slagter worked as a patient representative for Bil­
lings Hospital.
The Law School looks forward to the arrival of
Ms. Judith Wright, whose appointment as Law Li­
brarian and Lecturer in Law will be effective June 1,
1980. Ms. Wright obtained her B.S. degree at Mem­
phis State University and her M.A. from the Grad­
uate Library School at the University of Chicago;
she holds a JD degree from DePaul University.
From 1970-77, Ms. Wright served on the staff of
the Law School Library, most recently in the ca­
pacity of Reference Librarian.
Professor Douglas Laycock
Faculty Notes
Ronald H. Coase, Clifton R. Musser Professor
Emeritus of Economics, has been elected a Distin­
guished Fellow of the American Economics Asso-
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ciation. Mr. Coase was one of two members of the
Association thus honored in December, 1979.
Kenneth W. Dam, Harold J. and Marion F.
Green Professor in International Legal Studies and
former Director of the Law and Economics Pro­
gram, will become Provost of the University be­
ginning July 1, 1980. As Provost, Professor Dam
will be the senior academic officer of the Univer­
sity, under the President, and will be responsible for
overseeing and administering academic affairs.
Professor Richard A. Epstein
Professor Richard Epstein recently participated in
a workshop on Nuisance Law at the New York
University Law School. In January, he delivered
a speech on the Proposed Uniform Product Liabil­
ity Act during a conference of the American Asso­
ciation of Law Professors in Phoenix, Arizona.
Professor Edmund Kitch was appointed Director
of the Law and Economics Program effective Janu-
Professor Edmund W. Kitch
ary 1, 1980. Mr. Kitch has been a member of the
Law School faculty since 1965 and teaches courses
in regulated industries, legal regulation of the com­
petitive process, corporations, and securities.
Philip Kurland, Professor of Law and William R.
Kenan, Jr., Distinguished Service Professor in the
College, delivered a talk on "The Supreme Court
and its Critics" to a standing-room only audience
at the Law School's March Loop Luncheon for
alumni.
On January 11, William M. Landes, Professor of
Economics, and Richard A. Posner, the Lee and
Brena Freeman Professor of Law, presented a paper
entitled "Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Eco­
nomic Analysis," at the Social Science Research
Council Economics and Law Seminar, Hertford
College, Oxford, England.
Professor William M. Landes
During the fall and winter, Professor John Lang­
bein presented papers on French constitutional
criminal law at the annual meeting of the American
Society for Comparative Law and on the history of
the justices of the peace in England at the annual
meeting of the American Historical Association.
In November, 1979, Norval Morris, Julius Kree­
ger Professor of Law and Criminology, was given
the August Vollmer Award of the American So­
ciety of Criminology "for outstanding contribu­
tions to Criminal Justice."
Adolf Sprudzs, Foreign Law Librarian and Lec­
turer in Legal Bibliography, was awarded a re­
search fellowship by the Max Planck Institute for
Foreign and International Private Law in Ham­
burg, Germany, and spent the months of May,
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Adolf Sprudzs, Foreign Law Librarian
June, and July, 1979, at the Institute as a Visiting
Foreign Law Librarian.
He was invited to participate at the German Li­
brarians' Congress in West Berlin in June, 1979, and
gave a lecture on the American Association of Law
Libraries at the annual meeting of the Arbeitsge­
meinschaft fur juristisches Bibliotheksund Doku­
mentationsuiesen held during the Congress.
While on sabbatical from the Law School, Pro­
fessor James White has been writing a book on
rhetoric and culture for which he received a grant
from the National Endowment for the Humanities
(NEH). Based upon this work, Mr. White de­
livered a lecture at the University entitled "Thu­
cydides: The History of a Culture of Argument,"
sponsored by the Division of Humanities last fall.
During the summer of 1979, he directed a law
teachers' seminar on argument and literature, which
Professor James B. White
was held at the Law School under the auspices of
the NEH.
Hans Zeisel, Professor Emeritus of Law and Soci­
ology, has been elected a Fellow of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science.
Clerkships
For the first time ever, more than thirty Law School
graduates have clerkships in the same year-thirty­
one in 1979-80. The following is a list of those
graduates and the judges for whom they are clerk­
ing:
United States Supreme Court
Maureen Mahoney (Justice William H. Rehn­
quist)
Michele Odorizzi (Justice John Paul Stevens)
United States Courts of Appeals
Robert Kopecky (Chief Judge Frank M. Coffin,
1st Cir.)
Lloyd Day (Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman, 2d
Cir.)
Frederick Sperling (Judge James Hunger, III, 3rd
Cir.)
Thomas Bush (Chief Judge Collins J. Seitz, 3rd
Cir.)
Susanna Sherry (Judge John C. Godbold, 5th
Cir.)
David Frankford (Judge Irving L. Goldberg, 5th
Cir.)
Jon Carlson (Judge Alvin B. Rubin, 5th Cir.)
Michele Smith (Judge William J. Bauer, 7th Cir.)
Robert Shapiro (Judge Walter Cummings, 7th
Cir.)
Marilyn Lamar (Judge Richard D. Cudahy, 7th
Cir.)
John Laser (Judge Luther M. Swygert, 7th Cir.)
Michael McConnell (Chief Judge J. Skelly
Wright, D.C. Cir.)
United States District Courts
Carol Hayes (Judge B. Avant Edenfield, S.D.
Ga.)
Dean Polales (Judge Nicholas J. Bua, N.D. Ill.)
Michael Brody (Judge Bernard M. Decker, N.D.
Ill. )
Joseph Markowitz (Judge Bernard M. Decker,
N.D. Ill.)
Robert Weissbourd (Judge George N. Leighton,
N.D. Ill.)
Eric Yopes (Judge Phil M. McNagny, Jr., N.D.
Ind.)
John Farrell (Judge S. Hugh Dillon, S.D., Ind.)
Alan Smith (Chief Judge Irving Hill, C.D. Cal.)
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State Courts of Last Resort
Karen Herold (Judge Thomas E. Delahanty and
Judge David A. Nichols, Me.)
Joseph Lauela (Judge Charles Levin, Mich.)
Mary Probst (Judge George M. Scott, Minn.)
Rebecca Pallmeyer (unassigned, Minn.)
State Intermediate Courts
Timothy Huizenga (Judge Glenn K. Seidenfeld,
Ill. App.)
Robert Coyne (Judge Seymour Simon, Ill. App.)
Thomas Geselbracht (Judge Seymour Simon, Ill.
App.)
State Trial Courts
Marcus Chandler (Judge Ira A. Brown, Cal.
Super., San Francisco County)
John Mennite (Judge Ernest L. Alvino, N.J.
Super, Gloucester County)
Visiting Committee members. From left: Kenneth C. Prince
(JD'34, Chicago), Richard B. Berryman (JD'57, Washington,
D.C.), and Robert Karrer (MCL'66, Zurich, Switzerland)
Visiting Committee
On November 14 and 15, 1979, thirty-one mem­
bers of the Law School's Visiting Committee, the
purpose of which is to acquaint members of the
University's Board of Trustees with designated op­
erations of the University, met at the Law School.
The chairman of this committee is James T. Rhind,
a trustee of the University. The one and one-half
day program included presentations by Dean Ger­
hard Casper on the faculty, Assistant Dean Richard
Badger on the students, Professor John Langbein on
the library, Assistant Dean Holly Davis on funds,
Associate Dean James Gibson on building and space,
and representatives of various student organizations
on activities.
After committee members met with students over
lunch, they listened to a panel discussion on "How
to Improve the Quality and Experience of Trial
Lawyers." The panelists were Jack Corinblit (J.D.
'49), Judge Barrington D. Parker (J.D. '46), and
Professor Spencer L. Kimball.
At a dinner held in honor of the Visiting Com­
mittee, Professor Philip B. Kurland delivered a talk
on the Supreme Court.
Charles J. Merriam, 1903-1979
On November 4, 1979, Charles J. Merriam (JD '25),
one of the Law School's distinguished and loyal
alumni, died at the age of 76. Mr. Merriam practiced
patent law for over 50 years and was formerly a
senior partner in the Chicago law firm of Merriam,
Marshall & Bicknell. He had also served as Director
and President of the University of Illinois Founda­
tion.
Last Spring, the Law School was particularly hon­
ored and pleased by Mr. and Mrs. Merriam's gener­
ous endowment of the Charles J. Merriam FacuIty
Fund, created to support distinguished facuIty of the
Law School and visiting faculty. This quarter, Pro­
fessor A. W. B. Simpson, occupant of a chair at the
University of Kent at Canterbury, England, becomes
the first Charles J. Merriam Scholar.
Blackstone's Commentaries
The University of Chicago Press has recently issued
a four-volume facsimile of the eighteenth-century
first edition of William Blackstone's Commentaries
on the Laws of England. Blackstone's classic and
monumental work is further enhanced by introduc­
tions to each volume written by four contemporary
legal scholars: Stanley Katz, Professor of the His­
tory of American Laws and Liberty at Princeton
University and a former professor of law and his­
tory at the University of Chicago; A. W. Brian­
Simpson, Professor of Law at the University of
Kent at Canterbury and Visiting Professor at the
Law School, spring quarter; John Langbein, Pro­
fessor of Law at the Law School; and Thomas
Green, Professor of Law at the University of Mich­
igan.
Zonis on Iran
Marvin Zonis, Associate Professor at the University
of Chicago and former Director of the Center for
30
Middle Eastern Studies, discussed "Iran-The Islamic
Revival and the Future of the United States in the
Middle East" at the January Loop Luncheon for
alumni of the Law School.
Professor Zonis is the author of The Political
Elite of Iran and the co-author of Analysis of
United States-Iranian Co-operation in Higher Edu­
cation as well as numerous articles about Iran.
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Publications of the Faculty, 1979-80
WALTER BLUM
An Introduction to the Mathematics of Tax Planning,
TAXES-THE TAX MAGAZINE, Nov., 1979.
The Tax Expenditure Approach Seen through An­
thropological Eyes, 8 TAX NOTES 699 (1979).
Review of Lewis: THE ESTATE TAX, 4th ed., 64
A.B.A. j. 1374 (Sept., 1979).
The "Fair and Equitable" Standard for Confirming
Reorganizations under the New Bankruptcy Code,
53 AM. BANKRUPTCY L.]. (Winter, 1980).
LEA BRILMAYER
The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the
Case or Controversy Requirement, 93 HARV.L.REV.
297 (Dec., 1979).
Legislative Intent and the Metaphysics of Govern­
mental Interests in the Conflict of Laws, 78 Mich.L.
Rev. (forthcoming, ]an., 1980).
With Richard Heckler, Douglas Laycock, and Te­
resa Sullivan: Sex Discrimination in Employer Spon­
sored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic
Analysis, 47 U.CHI.L.REV. (forthcoming, 1980) (title
sub j ect to change).
DENNIS CARLTON
Contracts, Price Rigidity and Market Equilibrium, 81
].PoL.EcoN. 1034 (Oct., 1979).
Valuing Market Benefits and Costs in Related Mar­
kets, 69 AM.EcON.REV. 688 (Sept., 1979).
Planning and Market Structure in McCall (ed.): THE
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY (Uni­
versity of Chicago Press, 1980).
With William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner:
Public Policy toward Airline Mergers: A Case Study,
11 Bell] .Econ. (forthcoming, Spring, 1980).
GERHARD CASPER
With Philip B. Kurland, eds.: THE SUPREME COURT
REVIEW: 1979 (University of Chicago Press, 1980).
With Hans Zeisel: DER LAIENRICHTER 1M STRAFPRO­
ZESS [LAY ]UDGES IN CRIMINAL COURTS] (C. F. Miil­
ler, 1979).
DAVID P. CURRIE
The Mobile Source Provisions of the Clean Air Act,
46 U.CHI.L.REV. 811 (1980).
Nondegradation and Visibility under the Clean Air
Act, 68 CALIF.L.REV. 601 (1980).
Relaxation of Implementation Plans under the 1977
Clean Air Act Amendments, MICH.L.REV., forth­
coming, 1980.
KENNETH W. DAM
With Kenneth ]. Arrow, et al: THE NEXT TWENTY
YEARS, A STUDY GROUP REPORT (sponsored by the
Ford Foundation, Ballinger Publishing, 1979).
RICHARD A. EpSTEIN
Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two
Critics, 8 ].LEGAL STUD. 477 (1979).
Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian
Constraints, 8 J.LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979).
Plaintiff's Conduct in Products Liability Actions:
Comparative Negligence, Automatic Division, and
Multiple Parties, 45 ].AIR COM. 87 (1979).
Possession as the Root of Title, Ga.L.Rev., forth­
coming, 1979.
The Static Conception of the COn171l0n Law, 8
J .LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming, 1979).
GARETH JONES
With Sir Robert Goff: THE LAW OF RESTITUTION
(Sweet & Maxwell, 1979).
SPENCER KIMBALL
Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, A.B.F. RES.].
83, 1979.
EDMUND W. KITCH
Discussion of the Effectiveness of Government Regu­
lation, in Mitchell (ed.): OIL PIPELINES AND PuBLIC
POLICY 119 (American Enterprise Institute, 1979).
With Harvey Perlman: LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
COMPETITIVE PROCESS: CASES, MATERIALS AND NOTES
ON UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES, TRADEMARKS, COpy­
RIGHTS AND PATENTS (2nd ed., Foundation Press,
1979).
PHILIP B. KURLAND
With Gerhard Casper, eds.: THE SUPREME COURT
REVIEW: 1979 (University of Chicago Press, 1980).
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Brown v. Board of Education Was the Beginning.
The School Desegregation Cases in the United States
Supreme Court: 1954-1979, 2 WASH.U.L.Q. 309
(Spring, 1979).
Ruminations on the Quality of Equality, B.Y. L.REV.
1, 1979.
Book Review: The Power and the Glory: Passing
Thoughts on Reading Judge Sirica's Watergate Ex­
pose, 32 STAN.L.REV. 217 (1979).
Book Review: Variations on a Theme by Thomas
Jefferson (Pole: THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMER­
ICAN HISTORY), 88 YALE L.J. 898 (1979).
WILLIAM M. LANDES
With Richard A. Posner: Adjudication as a Private
Good, 8 J.LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979).
With Richard A. Posner: Should Indirect Purchasers
Have Standing to Sue under the Antitrust Laws? An
Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46
U.CHI.L.REV. (Spring, 1979).
With Richard A. Posner: Joint and Multiple Tort­
feasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J.LEGAL STUD.
(forthcoming, June, 1980).
With Richard A. Posner: Legal Change, Judicial Be­
havior and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J.LEGAL STUD.
(forthcoming, March, 1980).
With Dennis W. Carlton and Richard A. Posner:
Public Policy toward Airline Mergers: A Case Study,
11 BELL J.ECON. (forthcoming, Spring, 1980).
JOHN H. LANGBEIN
Crumbling of the Wills Act: Australians Point the
Way, 65 A.B.A. J. 1192 (1979).
Introduction to Sir William Blackstone: COMMEN­
TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, vol. III (Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1979).
Judging Foreign Judges Badly: Nose Counting Isn't
Enough, 18 THE JUDGES JOURNAL 4 (1979).
Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining,
13 L.SOC'Y.REV. 261 (1979).
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK
Catholic Schools and Teachers' Unions, 140 AMERICA
406 (1979).
Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The
Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U.CHI.L.REV. 636
(1979).
With Lea Brilmayer, Richard Heckler, and Teresa
A. Sullivan: Sex Discrimination in Employer Spon­
sored Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic
Analysis, 47 U.CHI.L.REV. (forthcoming, 1980) (title
subject to change).
Book Review: Injunctions and the Irreparable Injury
Rule (O.Fiss: THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION), 57
TEX.L.REV. 1065 (1979).
BERNARD D. MELTZER
LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (1980
supp., Little, Brown, 1980).
The Weber Case: Double Talk and Double Stan­
dards, REG. 34, Sept.jOct., 1979.
NORVAL MORRIS
Hans Mattick and the Death Penalty: Sentimental
Notes on Two Topics, 10 U.TOLEDO L.REV. 299
(Winter, 1979).
With Michael Tonry (eds.): CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN
ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH, vol. I (University of
Chicago Press, 1979).
The Justification of Imprisonment in David Peterson
and Charles Thomas (eds.): CORRECTIONS: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS (2nd ed., Prentice Hall, 1980).
The Sentencing Disease, 18 THE JUDGES' JOURNAL 8
( 1979).
With Michael Tonry: Sentencing Reform in Amer­
ica in P. R. Glazebrook: RESHAPING THE CRIMINAL
LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GLANVILLE WILLIAMS
(Stevens, 1979).
RICHARD A. POSNER
With William M. Landes: Adjudication as a Private
Good, 8 J.LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979).
The Antitrust Decisions of the Burger Court, 47
ANTITRUST L.J. 819 (1979).
The Bakke Case and the Future of "Affirmative
Action," 67 CALlF.L.REV. 171 (1979).
The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U.
PA.L.REV. 925 (1979).
Epstein's Tort Theory: A Critique, 8 J.LEGAL STUD.
457 (1979).
The Federal Trade Commission's Mandated-Disclo­
sure Program: A Critical Analysis in Harvey J. Gold­
schmid (ed.): BUSINESS DISCLOSURE: A GOVERN­
MENT'S NEED TO KNOW 331 (McGraw Hill, 1979).
The Homeric Version of the Minimal State, 90
ETHICS 27 (1979).
Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the Gyp-
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sum and Engineers Decision, 67 GEORGETOWN L.J.
1187 (1979).
. Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF.L.REV. 1
( 1979).
With William M. Landes: Should Indirect Pur­
chasers Have Standing to Sue under the Antitrust
Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois
Brick, 46 U.CHI.L.REV. 602 (1979).
Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46
U.CHI.L.REV. 281 (1979).
Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
Anthropology and Economics, 88 J.POL.ECON. (forth­
coming, June, 1980).
With Dennis Carlton and William M. Landes: Pub­
lic Policy toward Airline Mergers: A Case Study, 11
BELL J.ECON. (forthcoming, Spring, 1980).
The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, HOFSTRA L.
REV., forthcoming, 1980.
With William M. Landes: Joint and Multiple Tort­
feasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J.LEGAL STUD.
(forthcoming, June, 1980).
With William M. Landes: Legal Change, Judicial
Behavior and the Diversity Jurisdiction, 9 J.LEGAL
STUD. (forthcoming, March, 1980).
Optimal Sentences for White Collar Criminals, AM.
CRIM.L.REV., forthcoming, 1980.
Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9
J .LEGAL STUD. 71 (1980).
A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Refer­
ence to Law, 23 J.L.ECON. (forthcoming, April,
1980).
The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme
Court in Gerhard Casper and Philip B. Kurland
( eds.): THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW: 1979 (Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1980).
ANTON IN SCALIA
Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and
the Supreme Court, 1979 SUPREME COURT REV. 345
( 1980).
The Disease as Cure: "In Order to Get beyond
Racism We Must First Take Account of Race," 1979
WASH. U.LAW QUARTERLY 147.
With Murray L. Weidenbaum, eds.: REGULATION
(bimonthly, American Enterprise Institute).
ADOLF SPRUDZS
With Igor I. Kavass: EXTRADITION LAWS AND TREA­
TIES OF THE UNITED STATES (William S. Hein, 1979) .
Die Amerikanische Vereinigung der Rechtsbiblio­
theken: eine Skizze, 9 MITTEILUNGEN [der Arbeits­
gemeinschaft fur juristisches Bibliotheksu. Dokumen­
tationswesen] 63 (1979).
The International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law:
A Bibliographical Status Report, 28 AM. J.COMP.L.
93 (1979).
Review of Hajnal: GUIDE TO UNITED NATIONS OR­
GANIZATION, DOCUMENTATION AND PUBLISHING, 49 LI­
BRARY Q. 477 (1979).
Book Review: Max Rheinstein's Collected Works
Published, 25 L.ScH.REC. 25 (Winter, 1979).
GEOFFREY R. STONE
Analysis of Ohio v. Herschel Roberts (Docket No.
78-7)6), PREVIEW OF U.S. SUP.CT. CASES 2 (Oct. 31,
1979).
The FBI Charter, 26 L.ScH.REC. 3 (Spring, 1980).
Surveillance and Subversion, REVS.AM.HIST. (forth­
corning, 1980).
Thurgood Marshall: Frustrated Conscience of the
Court, NAT'L.L.J. 24 (Feb. 18, 1980).
JAMES B. WHITE
With James E. Scarboro: CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (1980 supp., Foundation Press, 1980).
HANS ZEISEL
With Gerhard Casper: DER LAIENRICHTER 1M STRAF­
PROZESS [LAY JUDGES IN CRIMINAL COURTS] (C. F.
Muller, 1979).
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING
With Richard Frase: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
(Little, Brown, 1979).
American Youth Violence: Issues and Trends in Mor­
ris and Tonry (eds.): CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN AN­
NuAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH (University of Chicago
Press, 1979).
Remarks as Commentator, Current Developments in
Judicial Administration, 80 F.R.D. 147, at 163 (1979).
With Gordon Hawkins: Ideology and Euphoria in
Crime Control, 10 U. TOLEDO L.REV. 370 (1979).
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Lost Alumni
The Law School is presently preparing a 1980
Alumni Directory and is in need of your assistance.
If you know a current address for any of the alumni
listed below, we would appreciate your informing
the Editor as soon as possible. Thank you for your
cooperation.
1915
Hirsch E. Soble
1916
Daniel S. Gishwiller
David J. Greenberg
1917
Elizabeth Perry
1918
Mary Wetsman Uhr
1919
Hsian Yuen Ho
Sylvia A. Miller
1920
Perry M. Chadwick
Louis Chiesa
Gleonard H. Jones
1921
Simon H. Alster
Irwin M. Baker
Chester E. Cleveland, Jr.
Maurice Y. Cohen
Albert H. Gavit
1923
Louis Lasman
1924
Carl Olaf Bue, Sr.
Edward M. Keating
Marion T. Martin
Carl J. Meyer
Leo Rice
1925
Silwing P. Au
Dale H. Flagg
Peter G. Gaudas
Sidney Rosenblum
1926
Wan H. Chiao
1927
Frederick A. Amos
Tsun Sin Su
Theodore J. Ticktin
1928
Jack H. Bender
Marcus W. Denny
Sander S. Kane
Martin Solomon
1929
Lester O. Blackman
Jack]. Franklin
David Freedkin
William Schull
1930
George H. Allison
Edward B. Meriwether
1931
Walter C. Hart
Louis F. Zubay
Jules M. Zwick
1932
Gordon M. Leonard
1933
Isaac I. Bender
Herman L. Fisher
William F. Zacharias
Bartel Zandstra
1934
Joseph M. Baron
1935
Glennie Gorton Baker
M. Daniel Frantz
Robert L. Oshins
Donald D. Rogers
Ralph L. Sherwin
1!J36
Joseph H. Buchanan
Maurice Chavin
1937
Alexis S. Basinski
Robert S. Leavitt
1938
Seymour Gorchoff
Phineas Indritz
Alexander A. Sutter
1939
Walter C. Shaw, Jr.
1942
John Norton Crane
Charles F. McCoy
Leonard S. Roberts
M. Jackson Underwood
1948
William J. Risteau
Milton P. Webster
1950
Robert Lederman
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1953
Dale W. Broeder
Elliott E. Stanford
1954
Sergio M. deSouza
Erroll E. Murphy
Paul N . Wenger
1955
Stanley A. Durka
Michael Para
1956
I. James Dines
Alfred J. Langmayer
Robert D. Ness
William R. Padgett
1957
Wilson R. Augustine
Harry ]. Holmes
Carl F. Salans
1958
Frank H. Burke
Bernard Farkas
1959
LeRoy E ... Endres
Ahmed Faraj Mohammed
Sandor O. Shuch
Thomas Tritschler
1960
Bruce L. Bromberg
Yiyun Shih
Maria A. Waters
1961
Hassan O. Ahmed
Ronald G. Carlson
Emil J . Venuti
Harry G. Wilkinson
1962 1967 Yean Hi Lee 1974
Ralph Lewis Olsen Bernadine R. Dohrn Shimelis Metaferia Jack Kay Levin
Jon E. Emanuel John H. Paer Paul A. Strandberg
1963 Gerhard Fischer Donald Teigen
R. S. Gustafson Djurica Krstic 197)
NorIan K. Hagen Viktor Mueller
1970
Richard F. Gang, Jr.
Wolfgang Lincklemann Wolfgang R. Ohndorf Constance L Abrams David S. Hammer
Mary C. Zeller Wing Robert A. Roth Detlef W. Graaf Jonathan Owen Lash
John M. Smokevitch James M. lacino Robert C. Pitcher
1964 Franz joseph-Bertus Ralph L. McMurry Kenneth L. Spector
Kwame Tua Opoku
Van Hoeck Batya Miller Dean Truby
John Schuchardt 1971
Annette Schwartzman 1968
Joseph J. Connell, Jr.
1976
David T. Cumming Jerry D. Craig Nancy Berger1965 Loren R. Dan Richard A. Hudlin Dale E. McNeil
Donna Ray Hagedorn Stephen L. Diamond John P. Kinneberg
Robert J. Marousek Michael Kaufman Orner Lee Reed 1977
Keshal B. Mathema Richard C. Mervis Louis Charles Roberts Barbara A. Lerner
Alex Jurna Steven Joel Shapero
Myron Gabriel Stagman 1969 1972
Ursula Bentele Stanley T. Fischer
1978
1966 Nathaniel L. Clark Charles Wolfinger Mary Ann Bernard
Ronald S. Bailis Terry D. Curtis David George Guest
Ronald L. Gunville Irwin Finkelstein 1973 W. Warren Scott, III
Alberto Mazzoni Paul A. Greenberg Thomas P. Dunn
Roger L. Severns Horst Gumpert David B. Parsons 1979
Klaus Von der Laden Robert B. Johnstone David L. Ross Douglas Joel Clubok
The University of Chicago Law Review
Includes a Wide Variety of Articles on Legal Topics of Current Interest
and Student Commentary Addressing Contemporary Legal Issues
Published Quarterly
by Students of
The University of Chicago
Law School
For information concerning subscriptions please address correspondence to the Publica­
tions Secretary, The University of Chicago Law Review, 1111 East 60th Street, Chicago,
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